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# ***JPRS Report—***

# **Central Eurasia**

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## ***Military Affairs***

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# Central Eurasia

## Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-92-022

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## CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

### Russian Ministry of Defense Appointments

92UM1127A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
11 Jun 92 First edition p 1

[Notice of appointments: "New Appointments"]

[Text] **Colonel-General Viktor Petrovich Dubynin**—chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, first deputy minister of defense of the Russian Federation

He was born 1 February 1943 in the city of Kamensk-Uralsk, Sverdlovsk Oblast. He graduated from the Far East Tank School in 1964.

He began his career in the forces as commander of a tank platoon. He commanded a company, a battalion and a regiment. In 1978, after graduating from the Military Academy of Armored Troops, he was appointed deputy commander of a division. He then commanded a division. In 1984 he completed the General Staff Military Academy. He served as first deputy commander of an army beginning in 1984. In 1986 he began serving as an army commander in the Turkestan Military District. In 1987 he became commander of a tank army in the Belorussian Military District. In 1988 he became chief of staff and first deputy commander of the Kiev Military District. He has served as commander of the Northern Group of Forces since 1989.

**Colonel-General Vladimir Mikhaylovich Toporov**—deputy minister of defense of the Russian Federation

He was born 7 February 1946 in the city of Baranovichi. He graduated from the Odessa Artillery School in 1968. He began his career in the forces as a platoon commander in an antitank battery and then commanded a battery in an airborne regiment. In 1975, after graduating from the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze, he was appointed deputy commander of a regiment. He assumed command of a regiment in 1977. He was appointed deputy commander of a division in 1979. He completed the General Staff Military Academy in 1984. He assumed command of a division in 1984. He was appointed first deputy commander of an army in 1987 and commander of an army in 1988. In 1989 he became chief of staff and first deputy commander of the Far East Military District. He has recently commanded the Moscow Military District.

**Colonel-General Valeriy Ivanovich Mironov**—deputy minister of defense of the Russian Federation

He was born 19 December 1943 in Moscow. He completed the Moscow Higher Combined-Arms Command School imeni Verkhovnyy Sovet RSFSR in 1965. He began serving in the forces as a platoon commander and then served as a company commander. In 1973, after graduating from the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze, he was appointed chief of staff and deputy commander of a regiment. He assumed command of a regiment in 1975, became deputy commander of a division in 1977 and division commander in 1979. He took part in combat operations in Afghanistan during the period 1979-1982. He completed the General Staff Military Academy in 1984. He was appointed deputy

commander of an army in 1984 and first deputy commander of the Leningrad Military District in 1989. He has recently commanded the Northwest Group of Forces.

**Colonel-General Georgiy Grigoryevich Kondratev**—deputy minister of defense of the Russian Federation

He was born 17 November 1944 in the city of Klintsy, Bryansk Oblast. In 1965 he graduated with distinction from the Kharkov Guards Tank Command School. He began his service in the forces as a tank platoon commander. In 1973, after graduating from the Armored Troops Military Academy with distinction, he became chief of staff of a regiment. He assumed command of a regiment in 1974 and served as deputy commander of a division and then division commander from 1978. He completed the General Staff Military Academy with distinction and a gold medal in 1985 and was appointed first deputy commander of an army in the Turkestan Military District. He assumed command of an army in 1987 and became first deputy commander of the Turkestan Military District in 1989. He has recently commanded the Turkestan Military District.

**Colonel-General Mikhail Petrovich Kolesnikov**—first deputy chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

He was born 30 June 1939 in the city of Yeysk, Krasnodar Kray. He completed the Omsk Tank Technical School in 1959.

He began serving in the forces as a platoon commander, then served as commander of a company and a battalion.

In 1975, after graduating from Military Academy of Armored Troops, he was appointed commander of a regiment. He became chief of staff and deputy commander of a division in 1977. He assumed command of a tank division in 1979. He completed the General Staff Military Academy in 1983. He assumed command of a corps in 1983, then became commander of an army in the Transcaucasus Military District. He became chief of staff and first deputy commander of the Siberian Military District in 1987. In 1988 he was appointed chief of staff and first deputy commander in chief of the southern sector. In 1990 he was appointed chief of the Main Staff and first deputy commander in chief of the Ground Forces. He became deputy chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR in 1991.

### Obituary: Mar Avn Koldunov

92UM1127B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 11 Jun 92 First edition p 4

[Obituary: "A.I. Koldunov"]

[Text] Chief Mar Avn Aleksandr Ivanovich Koldunov, prominent military leader, active participant in the Great Patriotic War, two-time Hero of the Soviet Union, has died in his 69th year of life, following a lengthy and serious illness.

A.I. Koldunov was born 20 September 1923 in the village of Moshchinovo in Monastyrskiy Rayon, Smolensk Oblast. He

began working at an early age. Prior to the war he studied at an air club and worked as a lathe operator in Moscow.

He entered the Kacha Aviation School for Pilots in February 1941. Upon graduating from it in March 1943, he was assigned to the field army. He fought with the Southwest and 3rd Ukrainian fronts as a fighter pilot and as commander of a flight and an air squadron.

He proved himself to be a bold and expert pilot, a skilled and courageous air fighter, with excellent piloting techniques. He took part in 358 combat sorties and conducted 96 air battles, in which he personally shot down 46 enemy aircraft.

After the war he graduated from the Military Air Academy and the General Staff Military Academy. He commanded an air regiment, a division, the Baku District aviation, a separate PVO army and the Moscow Air Defense District.

In December 1975 he was appointed first deputy commander in chief and in July 1978, commander in chief, of the Air Defense Forces.

In August 1987 he was appointed general inspector of the Group of Inspectors of the Ministry of Defense.

At all his posts A.I. Koldunov proved himself to be an enterprising and energetic military leader. He devoted all of his strength, knowledge and experience to enhancing the combat readiness of the forces.

We shall always carry bright memories of Aleksandr Ivanovich Koldunov, loyal son of his homeland, in our hearts.

B.N. Yeltsin, P.S. Grachev, Ye.I. Shaposhnikov, B.P. Dubynin, A.A. Kokoshin, V.M. Toporov, V.I. Mironov, G.G. Kondratyev, B.N. Samsonov, Yu.P. Maksimov, V.M. Semenov, B.A. Prudnikov, M.P. Kolesnikov, V.F. Miruk, V.P. Sinitsyn, N.I. Chukarin, R.S. Akchurin, S.L. Sokolov, V.G. Kulikov, B.I. Petrov, N.V. Ogarkov, S.A. Bobylev, Ye.S. Yurasov, I.M. Maltsev, N.D. Podgornyy, Yu.V. Botintsev, A.G. Smirnov, N.I. Moskvitalev, A.I. Khyupenan.

**From the commission for funeral arrangements for Chief Mar Avn A.I. Koldunov:**

The casket with the body of Chief Mar Avn A.I. Koldunov will be placed for viewing in the Red Banner Hall of the Central Soviet Army Club imeni M.V. Frunze (Ploshchad Kommuny, 2).

Persons wishing to bid farewell to the deceased may do so between 10:00 and 11:30 on 11 June 1992.

The funeral will be held on 11 June at the Novodevichye Cemetery.

## CIS: STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES

**Moscow ABM Defenses Said to Be Ineffective**  
*92UM1112A Moscow OGONEK in Russian*  
*No 16-17, 18 Apr 92-2 May 92 (3378-3379) p 8*

[Article by Anatoliy Kravtsov under the rubric "Opinion": "For What Purpose Are We Building Missiles?"]

[Text] The author of the following article is not a dilettante in the field of missile construction. He is a reserve colonel whose career has taken him from junior military representative to head of the military delegation at a design office which develops ABM weapons and to service in the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate. His opinion might appear unacceptable to other, still active specialists. If we are firmly resolved to merge into the community of civilized nations, however, is the question posed in the headline of the article so invalid?

Chamberlain, Hitler, Stalin.... In the mid-'30s not one of them expected a future war to be waged against his capital, but each of them was building his bunker. All three were receiving reports from the military on the soundness of the air defenses (PVO) and on the impregnability of the cities, particularly the capitals.

Moscow's PVO plan provided for repelling an attack from any direction, at any time of day or night, in any weather, from any altitude. By 22 July 1941 the Moscow PVO zone had 1,044 antiaircraft guns and 585 fighter aircraft. At a time when German aircraft were pounding the retreating Soviet troops with impunity, paralyzing them, the best weapons were defending Moscow in anticipation of raids. Even then, however, after the raids began, 229 fascist bombers penetrated to the capital between 22 July and 5 December 1941 alone. The city center caught it too, even the Kremlin.

England and the Americans built their PVO system together. At a time when our PVO was equipped with echolocators for detecting an air enemy (and those in limited quantities) and relied mainly on the ears of an entire army of air observers, the allies had an adequate quantity of radar stations. There appeared to be no limits to the inventiveness of the British military engineers. But then 16 June 1944 came, and the Germans inflicted the first massive missile attack against London. Its effect on morale was great, despite insignificant British losses. The missile was the V-1.

The first ballistic missile, the V-2, fell upon London on 8 September 1944. This was a fundamentally new weapon. The only protection against it was the evacuation of an additional 700,000 Londoners and strikes at plants, missile storage bases and combat positions of the Germans.

Experience with this kind of confrontation lets us draw a major conclusion. It is that defensive weapons produce good results only after they have been perfected, redesigned and adapted for use against specific weapons of attack.

Look at our present PVO. Read the books and justifications of the apologists for the military-industrial complexes of the USA and the USSR, and now those of the CIS and of Russia itself. Read the dissertations, technical plans and reports of state commissions. Look at the calculations of the most skilled mathematicians-and-estimators. All of the intellectual might of the military-industrial complexes has attempted and is still attempting to prove that ABM defense is essential, that we cannot get by without it.

Our military and civilian ministers, PVO commanders in chief, bigwigs in the military-industrial complexes and the deputies who echo them have made full use of the limits set for ABM weapons in the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of PVO Systems. It permits the deployment of 100 missiles against space attack, and we deployed them.

Now we have the president's announcement: "We are ready jointly to develop and then build and jointly operate a global defense system instead of SDI."

What is this? Mental derangement? A mistake? Destitute Russia with its collapsed industry and its enormously backward foundation taking part in "star wars"?

Let us assume for a minute that the Americans have taken us on as partners. Let us assume that the achievements of our nuclear scientists in the development of airborne nuclear reactors such as the Topaz electric-energy generator, which the Americans have been talking about using for going on 4 years now, would be useful to our proposed partners in ABM defense. Let us assume even that we succeed in "palming off" on them our launch vehicles, built with hopelessly obsolete basic equipment, or succeed in linking our spaceborne intelligence systems. But this is all difficult to accept when one considers our lag with respect to dependability (there is a reason, after all, why our nuclear reactors are blowing up, why three quarters of the ballistic-missile submarine fleet is parked at docks and in roadsteads and not performing alert duty, and so forth).

Let us put aside the political subtleties. The world does not consist just of the USA and CIS (or perhaps Russia or a mini-CIS). Will the rest of the world want to be under our "umbrella"? What if one of the other large nations does not want to be under it or does not believe the advertising extolling its dependability? How will this affect stability in the world even with a reduction of nuclear arsenals?

The designers themselves are aware of the commercial hype and the impossibility of achieving absolute reliability for a PVO system, of course. This kind of reliability cannot be achieved even in such a rich nation as the USA, not even with the technological assistance of such titans as Japan. Such systems are possible only on paper, on a computer disk or in the head of an engineering genius. That is, they are only possible in theory. Aware of this, the trumpeters of ABM defense and SDI make certain provisions, express a slant toward a limited, so-called zonal PVO and attempt to make it appear that the latter is reliable. Let us say that Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Washington and Los Angeles are 100% protected. But then Chernobyl demonstrated that there is no such thing as oases in a nuclear desert.

If PVO is needed to protect presidential residences from insane politicians though, who says that nuclear bombs will be delivered only by missiles and not by civilian aircraft or river barges, not in suitcases or by earth-moving equipment? A madman could not care less about the little umbrellas, when there are already 430 operating nuclear power plants, thousands of nuclear reactors and tens of thousands of chemical plants in the world. Far more missiles could penetrate PVO systems than suggested in the secret calculations, however. Such a system would not knock down even

an individual missile launched, God forbid, by some madman. Do we not have adequate proof in recent cases in which it took the American PVO so long to identify false warning signals or from our experience with Rust's landing at the base St Basil's Cathedral?

With respect to the technical aspect of the matter, the probability of destroying a missile with one antimissile high-explosive fragmentation, shaped charge, rod charge or any other nonnuclear, axial-type projectile is very low. Even assuming that guidance was ideal (almost up to the point of impact) and the probability of a hit is 50%, it is not especially difficult to estimate that the launching of two missiles would increase the probability by only 25% and that it would take more than three missiles to increase the probability to 90%. Our ballistic missiles, known as Scud missiles, which are huge, high-contrast hulks and make fine targets flying from known directions at an anticipated time, were frequently shot down by the Israeli PVO system, which is considered to be fairly well perfected. Three or four Patriot missiles were used to shoot down one of Husayn's Scuds. Even this obviously poor performance, however, was used to advertise the Patriot system as an allegedly effective ABM weapon.

It is as though no one noticed that the Americans had modernized the system especially for destroying such ballistic missiles, even though the 1972 Agreement forbade the building of mobile ABM weapons. Our military and our politicians issued no statements on the matter. And why not? Perhaps because the Scud is an intercontinental missile with the corresponding speeds. Why no, it was because they themselves had assigned ABM missions to our own antiaircraft missile systems. Specifically to the S-300 system.

The unabashed promotion of ours and American antiaircraft missiles is proceeding at full speed and appears to be producing results. It is helping the military-industrial complexes obtain subsidies. This is disastrous, particularly for our depleted economy. Even more significant and dangerous, however, is the fact that this promotion is helping to maintain in the broad masses and among politicians the illusion that they are protected and is influencing the adoption of financial, military and political decisions by the latter. I shall venture to say that the illusion of the possibility of protecting cities, facilities and troops against nuclear missile strikes is just about the biggest hoax today

Thanks to the extremely high state of their disinformation art, the American and Soviet military-industrial complexes succeeded in obtaining allocations for SDI and for ABM defense. It took no special effort to get the controllers of finances to open up the purse strings. It was enough to create the appearance that each side feared the ABM defense work being conducted by the "enemy," in order to tune the diplomatic, parliamentary and other lobbyists in onto the wavelength of its alleged stabilizing effect.

A declaration by leaders and representatives of 36 academies of sciences (including those of the USSR and the USA) signed in Rome in 1982 pointed out that there is no protection against nuclear weapons. Back when SDI had just been conceived, many prestigious scientists convincingly

demonstrated the detriment of the very idea that an effective ABM defense was achievable and substantiated the impossibility of winning "star wars."

No one has yet refuted the fact that fewer than 1% of the nuclear warheads need to reach the target in order to strike a mortal blow. A "shield" capable even of repelling 99% of the strikes is therefore senseless. Even if nuclear arsenals are cut 10-fold, one can hardly count on reliability for the "shield," because shooting down 90% of all the targets is an absolutely unrealistic mission.

The author did not agree with the assertion that an ABM defense was needed by the USSR and does not agree that one is needed by the Russian Federation. It is not needed, because it is impossible even if enormous sums of money are spent. An absolute, global ABM defense system is unrealistic and unattainable the same as developing an eternal engine, finding the finite value for an irrational number or drawing a square circle.

One can agree with those specialists who believe that our ABM defense set up around Moscow is not only ineffective, although billions were spent on it and money is still being spent to keep it operable with the help of thousands of specialists. Worse than that, it is dangerous. And the sooner we dismantle it, melt it down for the metal and turn the motor vehicles, electric power plants and other equipment over to the national economy, the better it will be for Russia and for the entire world. Have we not done enough building "cannons for shooting sparrows" and polluting space with trash and garbage?

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### CIS: GROUND TROOPS

#### 14th Army Commander Offers Clarification on Withdrawal from Dneister

*92UM1106A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA  
in Russian 5 Jun 92 p 2*

[Article by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA correspondent Nikolay Panyukov: "14th Army Offers Clarification"]

[Text] The news media have been disseminating information to the effect that the officers and men of the 14th Combined-Arms Army are reportedly in a quandary caused by the Russian Federation President's statement relative to withdrawal of the army's units from the Dniester area, and that, on this basis, the army has no intention of pulling out of this area.

General Yu. Netkachev, the commander of this army, stated in a telephone conversation with RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA's correspondent that the information being circulated by the media is in need of substantial correction.

"To withdraw from the area or to remain here is not a matter for us -military people - to decide," Yuriy Maksimovich stated in an emphatic tone. "That is a decision to be made by politicians.

"However, we do have our own opinion relative to this matter, and it is that we should initiate the withdrawal of the

Army from the Dniester area only after the question of the Army's status is settled. The politicians must sit down at the conference table and they must effectuate that which the people demand.

"After a meeting of the minds is achieved on this subject, then we could depart from here with peace of heart and mind. If we were to do otherwise, our withdrawal would be perceived as an act of betrayal in the Dniester area, since the Army here is looked upon as the force functioning to some extent to prevent passions from boiling over."

### CIS: NAVAL FORCES

#### 1150 Carloads Lost in Pacific Arsenal Disaster

*92UM1075A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 19 May 92 p 1*

[Report: "An Arsenal Explodes: An Investigation Is Underway"]

[Text] "It is still difficult to determine the true extent of the damage caused the Pacific Fleet by the explosion of the ammunition dumps," it was reported at the press center of the Pacific Fleet commander. We know only that more than a third of the ammunition stored at the arsenal exploded. That is around 1,150 carloads. Six people were injured. One was killed as a result of negligent handling of an unexploded shell."

Unfortunately, there have been instances of looting and theft at the ill-fated depot. The very day of the explosion a clothing depot was broken into, and an attempt was made to enter a food storage facility. More than 200 people were arrested by the police and patrols as they attempted to remove ammunition and personal gear from the arsenal area. Based on the preliminary investigation inadvertent arson is being considered. The fire may have been ignited by a cigarette in a powder dump. Suspects have been arrested. An investigation is underway.

#### List of Naval Disasters, 1987-1991

*92UM1075B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 26 May 92 p 8*

[Report under the rubric "Returning to What Was Published": "Is Our Navy Sinking?"]

[Text] The 21 May 1992 issue of ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA contained an article with the headline "Is Our Navy Sinking?" It made public for the first time data on accidents involving submarines of the Soviet Navy for the period 1987-1991. Today we are publishing data on other naval vessels.

#### Accidents in the Soviet Navy (1987-1991):

On 9 January 1987 a medium landing ship of the Polunochnik class was torn from anchor in the roadstead of a port in the Baltic Sea, was carried onto a coastal sandbank and became jammed in landfast ice. The ship was removed from the sandbank by fleet rescue vessels.

On 20 February 1987 a small Aist-class assault hydrofoil of the Baltic Fleet suffered major damage from a fire in the main engine room.

On 15 April 1987 a fire caused by a short circuit on a Krivak-class patrol boat put part of the electrical equipment in the forward machine compartment out of action. No one was injured.

On 22 April 1987 a hole was punched above the waterline in the large ASW ship Admiral Nakhimov of the Krest-2 class as a result of striking the wharf while mooring in the port of Severomorsk.

On 15 July 1987 a missile boat of the Osa class went aground in the dark in Aniva Bay near the island of Sakhalin due to large errors made in calculating its coordinates. Thanks to the silty bottom the hull was not damaged, and the boat was removed from the shallows by tugboats.

On 13 October 1987 one crew member died while extinguishing a fire which broke out while taking on fuel on a large ASW ship of the Kashin class in the Mediterranean Sea.

On 17 October 1987 ship control systems and instruments were put out of action by a fire which occurred on an Alligator-class assault landing ship of the Pacific Fleet while it was moored.

On 12 February 1988 two patrol ships of the Krivak-1 and Petya classes collided with the American military ships Yorktown and Caron in the Black Sea 9 miles off the Crimean Peninsula while driving encroachers out of Soviet territorial waters.

On 8 September 1988 an ASW ship of the Grisha-5 class and a Pauk-class border patrol ship collided in the dark during an exercise in the Sea of Japan. The hulls of both ships were damaged but both returned to base under their own power.

On 8 December 1988, while guarding a practice firing area in the Baltic Sea at night, a Kon-class patrol ship collided with a Soviet fishing vessel, which sank 8 hours later. The military ship took all of the fishermen on board. The stem of the patrol ship was warped.

On 10 March 1988 a fire broke out while welding was being done on a Krivak-class patrol ship anchored at the Vladivostok ship-repair plant. This necessitated additional repairs.

On 14 April 1988 the research vessel Adzhariya struck a Turkish vessel while departing the quay wall in the port of Cork. The two vessels suffered slight damage.

On 24 February 1989 the military ship Khariton Laptev went aground on a sand bar while departing its mooring in the port of Cienfuegos, from which it was removed by tugboats. The hull was not damaged.

On 28 March 1989 the forward electric power installations were put out of action by fires on a large Kara-class ASW ship of the Pacific Fleet while anchored at a mooring.

On 19 August 1989 a Vanya-class coastal minesweeper suffered major damage and sank following an ammunition

explosion and a subsequent large fire at a mooring in the port of Ochamchir in the Black Sea. Two crew members were killed.

On 14 September 1989 the Pacific Fleet's auxiliary tanker Ilim and the medium maritime fishing trawler Tungus collided and suffered damage to their hulls while approaching the port of Nakhodka in the speed assignment zone because of violations of the MPPSS-72 [no expansion given] requirements. None of the crew members was injured.

On 1 February 1990, while moored to a buoy in the roadstead near the city of Vladivostok system several compartments in the forward part of the aircraft-carrying cruiser Minsk were flooded somewhat because of a leak in the fire-safety system, as a result of which some entire equipment assemblies had to be replaced.

On 21 March 1990 a fire broke out on the aircraft-carrying cruiser Kiev because of violations of fire-safety measures while welding work was being performed on it at the ship-repair plant in Murmansk. Significant damage to the fixtures and the compartments was prevented by steps taken to fight the fire. None of the personnel was injured.

On 14 October 1990, at the entrance to the Rukhnu Island harbor in the Baltic Sea, a Polunochnik-class assault landing ship came into contact with underwater rocks and suffered damage to the underwater part of the hull.

On 5 November 1990 a short circuit in the lighting of one of the cabins caused a fire on the sounding vessel GKS-23 anchored at the quay wall of the interkolkhoz ship-repair plant in the city of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy. The fire was not promptly isolated, which resulted in the burning of compartments in the lower deck of the superstructure and put the vessel out of commission.

On 10 November 1990 the Northern Fleet's auxiliary vessel Agatan was torn from its anchorage and tossed onto coral reefs near shore in a storm near La Mulata Bay on the island of Cuba. The vessel returned to Severomorsk following work at the dock in the port of Havana.

On 11 November 1990 a fire burned four cabins and damaged certain machinery and electrical equipment in the forward part of a large Udaloy-class ASW ship anchored at a mooring in Severomorsk. There were no injuries among the crew.

On 20 November 1990 the large ASW ship Marshal Voroshilov collided with the refrigerated transport Gorets at the entrance to the port of Vladivostok at night during a storm. The vessels received insignificant damage to the hulls above the waterline.

On 26 November 1990 a flaw in the gas line to the main engine caused a fire in the engine room on the auxiliary vessel SFL-340 in Peter the Great Bay. Vessels from a rescue detachment were enlisted to help fight the fire. The vessel was put out of action for a long time.

On 10 September 1990 a leak in a fuel line caused a fire on the tanker Dunay, which was rapidly extinguished. There were no injuries.

## CIS/RUSSIAN MILITARY ISSUES

On 9 June 1991 burning trash damaged cable lines running through an auxiliary compartment on the Admiral Gorkov which was anchored at its base.

On 15 June 1991 a fire broke out on the aircraft-carrying cruiser Kiev while being repaired at base, burning two cabins and damaging some service areas. The crew members were not injured.

On 17 July 1991 fuel fumes in tank No. 2 on the tanker Izhora were ignited while welding was being performed with the tanker moored at the ship-repair plant in Vladivostok. Three plant workers were killed.

On 10 June 1991 a pilot's error caused a Sovremennyy-class destroyer to strike the wharf in the port of Antwerp. The forward part of the ship and the wharf were damaged.

#### Cancellation of Rescue WIG Project Viewed

*92UM1097A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
4 Jun 92 First edition p 1*

[Article by Captain 2nd Rank A. Korolev: "What Will the Future of Russia's Navy Be Tomorrow if We 'Cut' Its Future Today?"]

[Text] For now Russia is seeking, agonizingly with difficulty, a comprehensive formula for its statehood and has been compelled to begin creating its own Armed Forces with an audit of that which it obtained as a legacy from the former Union and that legacy continues to diminish in the situation of confusion. For now politicians and scholars in uniform and out of uniform are intensely defining the spectrum of the young state's interests and the new provisions of the military doctrine and the inertial destruction of military scientific schools, scientific cadres, and military industry continues. In the meantime, the creation of the army and navy are being complicated precisely by the fact that the ground and naval forces that have passed into Russia's possession will require re-equipping with more modern equipment.

Today, we have already learned of many examples of the termination of promising design-planning work, many models of military equipment that were already in the process of completion and finishing are ending up under the blow torch and under the press as a result of the difficult financial situation. For example, the Navy, which for the first time in 60 years does not have a ship laid in the building slips, has borne great losses. And here is a fresh example: the nearly built search and rescue experimental ekranoplan [wing-in-ground effect vehicle] has been condemned to the blow torch.

The Komsomolets nuclear submarine disaster in which 42 men died demonstrated how urgent the need is for effective systems to rescue people at sea. Rescue ships are slow-moving and rescue helicopters have a limited operating radius and can only be used in coastal areas. And aircraft are not capable of rendering effective assistance to people who are victims of an accident in the water.

A wing-in-ground effect vehicle is a vehicle which combines the high speed of an aircraft with the seagoing qualities of a ship. A wing-in-ground effect vehicle is an apparatus that in

its primary mode of movement—flight at extremely low altitudes—uses the effect of the proximity of the water or other relatively level underlying surface of the so-called "screen". In the "screen" mode, the lifting force of the wing increases by a factor of 1.5-2 due to the formation of a dynamic air cushion which permits the development of wing-in-ground effect vehicles that exceed modern aircraft in weight. A durable ship-type hull permits the wing-in-ground effect vehicle to be at sea for a prolonged period of time under poor weather conditions.

In 1989 after the loss of the Komsomolets, a decision was made to develop the first experimental search-and-rescue wing-in-ground effect vehicle that received the arbitrary designation "Spasatel" [Rescuer]. The detail design was completed in 1991. Construction of the Spasatel was occurring simultaneously with the design work at an experimental plant. At the present time, Spasatel is approximately 60 percent complete.

In 1990-1991, full-scale tests were conducted on the Navy's existing wing-in-ground effect vehicle, the Spasatel prototype, that confirmed the wing-in-ground effect vehicle's great capabilities to conduct rescue operations at sea. The developed wing-in-ground effect vehicle should have a flight speed of over 500 kilometers per hour and a flight range of 3,000 kilometers. Capacity is up to 500 rescued people. The designers envision a hospital with operating and resuscitation rooms, a room for victims, and a special processing facility to render assistance to victims as the result of nuclear power plant accidents.

So, will we soon receive the unique rescue craft for which seamen have waited so long? And that's just the point—no. I did not have time to raise my hand to write, but Spasatel... has been excluded from the military ship construction plan and work on its development has practically ceased. The question is being raised about cutting up the hull of the wing-in-ground effect vehicle that is under construction for scrap metal because it is occupying an expensive place at the shipbuilding slip. In the process, the customer—the Navy in the person of the search-and-rescue service—is advancing serious reasons.

First of all, the wing-in-ground effect vehicle is an expensive item and one vehicle cannot carry out all of the tasks. A minimum of three vehicles each are needed in the Northern and Pacific fleets. With the current reduction of military expenditures, it is impossible to allocate these resources. Secondly, we need to equip a basing facility for wing-in-ground effect vehicle operations and this will require capital construction for which there are also no resources.

It is a well-known fact that modern equipment are extremely expensive. But how much is a human life worth? They always assured us that it is impossible to assess a human life in rubles—a human life, they said, is priceless. Abroad a human life is assessed by the cost of insurance. For example, the cost of insurance for an English merchant fleet seaman is an average of 80,000 pounds sterling which when converted is nearly R14.5 million. We could have finished building Spasatel for that money in 1991.

There is one other reason that is impeding the wing-in-ground effect vehicle's path to the fleet—the notorious lack of coordination between departments. Developed according to a Navy order, the wing-in-ground effect vehicle must then be transferred to the air force for operation. Since there is still no provision on air force and navy cooperation during the development and operation of wing-in-ground effect vehicles, the air force is afraid of obtaining a "pig in a poke" which, moreover, will carry out Navy PSS [search-and-rescue service] missions and the search-and-rescue service does not want to be involved with a system that is in the air force's hands.

There is one other aspect of the problem. The termination of the wing-in-ground effect vehicle field will result in the loss of our country's being first in that sphere. According to American expert assessments, Russia is approximately 12-15 years ahead of the United States on the issues of developing this technology. While recognizing Russia's leadership in the sphere of development and operation of wing-in-ground effect vehicles, the Americans intend to utilize the achievements of our experts and to begin work on development of a 5,000 ton wing-in-ground effect vehicle with a 1,500 ton capacity for the U.S. Navy's amphibious landing forces. To do this, they propose inviting leading wing-in-ground effect vehicle designers to the United States. These negotiations are already being conducted, thereby creating the conditions for the drain of highly-skilled personnel and leading technologies from Russia.

Many foreign experts think that wing-in-ground effect vehicles will make a breakthrough in the 21st Century in the sphere of maritime transportation. Thanks to their large cargo capacity and the lack of need to build airfields to receive them, they will become a serious competitor for both seagoing ships and aircraft.

The wing-in-ground effect vehicle's fate, which we are discussing, is the fate of just one project. In the avalanche of problems which have currently come crashing down on the Navy and the Armed Forces as a whole, maybe this is a detail. But I think that we are currently very often encountering that dramatic collision that has been manifested in this case on which we have focused. I understand that we must live according to our means. I understand that today, when the military budget is extremely strained, we need to cancel some things and that some things have to suffer. But that is the issue—what do we reject and how do we make the choice? Is it correct or rational that quite promising programs and developments that have priority on the world level are turning out to be "victims"? Will we not kick ourselves over a lost opportunity in several years, having been left hopelessly behind in an area where we are now ahead of the others? Are we not saving too extravagantly against the future?

In general, the matter is not in the fate of this specific project. The matter is in the principle.

## UKRAINE

**Morozov on Controversy over Gen Kuznetsov's Appointment**

92UM1086C Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
16 May 92 p 1

[Interview with Ukrainian Minister of Defense, Colonel-General Konstantin Petrovich Morozov by an unidentified NARODNAYA ARMIYA correspondent: "Ukrainian Minister of Defense, Colonel-General Konstantin Morozov: 'Maintain Loyalty to Duty and to the Oath'"]

[Text] Ukraine is creating its Armed Forces. Servicemen have made their choice, having sworn allegiance to the Ukrainian people. And still, quite a few questions and problems arise surrounding this process. A NARODNAYA ARMIYA correspondent interviewed Ukrainian Minister of Defense, Colonel-General Konstantin Morozov about several of them.

[NARODNAYA ARMIYA] Konstantin Petrovich, right now we can say that the process of taking the military oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people has basically been completed. There were many problems surrounding this issue and passions raged. What are your conclusions? Was the correct course taken?

[Morozov] Yes, you could say that. This process began on 3 January 1992, that is from the first day of the creation of our Armed Forces in Ukraine. By March, the absolute majority of the servicemen had made their choice. But that process has not ended. Suffice it to say that a large number of Black Sea Fleet seamen have still not been able to exercise their rights due to well-known circumstances. Servicemen of units that until recently were waiting for a solution to the question of whether or not they belonged to the so-called strategic forces are in that same situation.

I am sure that we took the correct course. The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet defined the main criterion to assess our readiness to serve the people and the state, and to defend our land. The solemn ritual of the servicemen's oath to the Ukrainian people became that criterion. The majority of the Ukrainian people have supported this correct decision so there are no grounds for reproaching us. Servicemen who are on active duty and in the reserves, army and navy veterans, parents of soldiers and cadets, and citizens—everyone participated in the process.

Of course, there are costs and there will certainly be more. But the process of taking the oath of allegiance to our own people has become that line, which by crossing we acquired the moral and juridical status of belonging to the state structure which has a clearly defined task—to be the defender of our state, our people and our land. Without such concrete concepts, there cannot be an army, and there is none anywhere in the world.

[NARODNAYA ARMIYA] Taking the oath to your own people is a necessary criterion, but is it sufficient? Aren't there other criteria that determine serviceman's allegiance to his own people and state?

[Morozov] Certainly, loyalty to the oath itself. Recall its content: each word defines exhaustive standards of conduct for any of us who serve in the Armed Forces. All of our life in the army, every day of it, every deed—are in them. They should be commensurate with the words of the oath at all times.

The army is intensely loyal to its people and professionalism. And these requirements are contained in the text of the military oath.

I would like to take the opportunity to once again stress that in this process nationality does not have any significance. The main thing is to be a citizen of Ukraine, to have a feeling toward Ukraine like toward your own Homeland, to love your people and the land of your fathers. This has always been the main principle in the history of the Ukrainian host. The sons of all the Ukrainian lands were already serving in the Cossack camps and the Sech Streltsy detachments.

[NARODNAYA ARMIYA] And still the question on nationality worries servicemen... There is the sensational story of General Kuznetsov. What do you think, why did speculation become possible surrounding this?

[Morozov] In this case, something that someone wanted was carried out. The question of Maj-Gen Kuznetsov's transfer in service was a simple personnel issue. We tried to do it politically. We have made hundreds of assignments and did not suspect that one of them would cause such a storm of emotions. General Kuznetsov has been considered for a promotion in service since February. He was nominated for military district commander. There were several variations but they settled on the designation of chief of one of the most important directorates in the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. With this designation, we would have had a representative of the region and a trained specialist. But, obviously, we know about those personal goals that were aroused by ambition and the man departed from the main principles about which we were just speaking. There were insults, fabrications and declarations about a hunger strike—all of that was incompatible with the honor and dignity, not to mention the oath of allegiance that he had already taken to the Ukrainian people.

And here once again, nationality has nothing to do with it. They use it for unseemly ends. Right now, they are also using his statements on the questions that the certification commission posed to him. We investigated them. In reality, there it was a question of those same criteria of loyalty to the people, the state and the oath. It has been used for those same ends by those same people. While extending the individual fabrications of one person, these people do not cite those important arguments as the provision of the Ukrainian Laws "On the Defense of Ukraine" and "On the Ukrainian Armed Forces," and the essence of Ukrainian state policy that has been expressed in its military doctrine. For example, this important argument is ignored, "...Ukraine does not have territorial pretensions against any state or people and does not regard any state or people as an enemy..." and others.

Officers in units have condemned General Kuznetsov's attempt to perform political innuendo around his designation and his refusal to obey an order.

[NARODNAYA ARMIYA] Really, after all of that, will you insist on his arrival to work in the Ministry of Defense?

[Morozov] Of course not. As a result of an administrative investigation of General Kuznetsov's deeds, his actions have been classified as illegal, as a deviation from the military oath he took and as incompatible with the high rank of an officer of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

On 11 May, the term for his arrival at his new duty location expired and, the following day an order was published on his release from the Armed Forces. Materials will have been sent to the procurator.

[NARODNAYA ARMIYA] Konstantin Petrovich, our army is still being formed and the troops are carrying out the tasks for defense of Ukraine's interests...

[Morozov] Yes, we continue to carry out the plan to create the Ukrainian Armed Forces. We are concluding the formation of command and control organs at the Ministry of Defense, in the military districts, and in the troops.

By way of illustration, I can name the generals and officers who have been designated to leadership positions with Russian family names so as not to give the opportunity somewhere to dispose people to feign prejudice. In the Ministry of Defense: Generals Grechaninov, Avdeyev, Prokofyev, Utkin and a second Grechaninov; in the military districts: Commanders Generals Stepanov and Boriskin; Air Force Commander Vasiliev and his Chief of Staff Petrov; Navy Commander Kozhin; and, Army Commander Strelnikov.

In principle, the criteria are the same for everyone. And everyone has an equal opportunity to serve Ukraine. You only need to want that.

#### Decree on Military Collegium of Ukrainian Ministry of Defense

925D0452A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
20 May 92 p 1

[Decree of the Ukrainian President on Forming the Military Collegium of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and the Military Councils in the Military Districts (Operational Commands) and the Joint Armed Forces of Ukraine]

[Text] In the aim of ensuring the implementation of the decrees of the Ukrainian Defense Council and collegiality in elaborating decisions related to the leadership of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, I hereby decree:

1. To form a Military Collegium of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense with the following membership:

- The Ukrainian minister of defense as the Collegium's chairman,
- The chief of the Main Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the Ukrainian first deputy minister of defense,
- The Ukrainian first deputy minister of defense,
- The Ukrainian deputy minister of defense,
- The deputy minister of defense for weaponry and weaponry chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces,

—The deputy minister of defense for rear services and chief of the rear services of the Ukrainian Armed Forces,

—The deputy minister of defense for personnel and chief of the Personnel Directorate of the Ukrainian Armed Forces,

—The chief of the Sociopsychological Service of the Ukrainian Armed Forces,

—The first deputy chief of the Main Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

2. To set up military councils in the military districts (operational commands), in the formations of the Air Forces, the Navy, the Air Defense Forces, the RVSN [Strategic Missile Forces] with the following membership:

—The commander as the chairman of the military council,

—The representative of the Ukrainian President in the oblast,

—The chairman of the council of people's deputies in the oblast on the territory of which the corresponding headquarters of the formations are located,

—The chief of staff and the first deputy commander,

—The first deputy commander,

—The chief of the Sociopsychological Service.

Upon a petition from the appropriate commanders, the membership of the military councils may include (by order of the Ukrainian minister of defense):

—The deputy commander for weaponry,

—The deputy commander for rear services,

—The commander of the air army (air group),

—The commander of the Air Defense Region.

3. The Ukrainian minister of defense is to work out drafts of the regulations governing the Military Collegium and the military councils and submit these for approval to the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers.

[Signed] President of Ukraine L. Kravchuk.  
Kiev, 26 May 1992.

#### Ukraine Law on Military Obligation, Service

925D0420A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
12 May 92 pp 2, 3, 4

[“Law of Ukraine on Universal Military Obligation and Service”]

[Text]

#### CHAPTER I.

##### General Provisions

###### Article 1. Universal military obligation

1. Defending the country from armed aggression is among the most important functions of the state and is the concern of all the people of Ukraine. Defense of Ukraine is the constitutional duty of each of its citizens.

2. The universal military obligation is established for the purpose of staffing the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the National Guard of Ukraine, the Security Service of Ukraine,

## STATE AND LOCAL MILITARY FORCES

the Border Troops of Ukraine, the Civil Defense of Ukraine, the Administration for Protection of High Officials of Ukraine, and other military formations created in keeping with legislation of Ukraine, and also for preparing the population for the defense of Ukraine.

The universal military obligation includes:

- preparation of citizens for military service
- registration with draft boards
- draft for military service
- service under draft or voluntary military or alternative (nonmilitary) service
- performance of military duty in reserve
- observance of all rules of military registration.

In time of war the universal military obligation includes also compulsory universal military training of citizens.

The execution of the law of Ukraine "On Universal Military Obligation and Military Service" is the responsibility of citizens of Ukraine, the central organs of state government, organs of local state government and local self-government, and public associations, enterprises, institutions, and organizations, regardless of their jurisdiction or form of ownership.

The universal military obligation does not extend to foreign citizens or individuals without citizenship who are permanently or temporarily residing on the territory of Ukraine.

3. With respect to the universal military obligation citizens of Ukraine are divided into the following categories:

- pre-inductees—individuals undergoing pre-inductee training before registration in their draft districts
- inductees—individuals registered in their draft districts
- military servicemen—individuals performing military service
- drafted employees—individuals performing alternative (nonmilitary) service
- reservists—individuals in the reserve
- nonreservists—individuals not accepted for military registration or removed from it, including those transferred into the reserve or retired.

4. Citizens of Ukraine eligible for military service in terms of health and age are obliged to:

- report when summoned by the military commissariat to the draft board for registration, medical examination, training for acquiring a military specialty, induction into the military service, or routine training
- take training for military service, perform military service and perform military duties in the reserve
- follow the rules of military registration.

5. Women trained in medical specialties or specialties related to a corresponding military specialty according to a list determined by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine may be accepted for military registration. They must report when summoned by the military commissariat for a medical examination and follow the rules of military registration.

During peacetime women may voluntarily enter the military service under contract. During wartime individuals of the

feminine gender who are on the military rosters or have gone through general military training may be called up for military service by a decision of the president of Ukraine.

### **Article 2. Military service and satisfying military obligation in the reserve**

1. Military service is the honorable duty of each citizen of Ukraine, a special kind of state service linked to the performance by a citizen of Ukraine of his universal military duty and service on a competitive-contractual basis in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other forces created in keeping with legislation of Ukraine.

The following kinds of military service are established:

- compulsory military service
- military service under contract in positions of privates and seamen
- military service of women under contract in positions of privates and seamen, sergeants and senior noncommissioned officers, warrant officers in the Army and Navy, and commissioned officers
- military service under contract for warrant officers in the Army and Navy
- military service under contract for trainees (students) in military training institutions and students of military departments (faculties for military training, divisions for military training) of higher civilian educational institutions
- military service under contract as officer personnel.

2. Performance of military duty in the reserve during peacetime consists of following the procedure and rules of military registration, attending training sessions, maintaining and improving military knowledge, skills, and abilities necessary for the performance of duties of military service, and during wartime—according to military-registration or civilian specialties.

3. Citizens of Ukraine who have been drafted or have volunteered for military service take a military oath of fidelity to the people of Ukraine, and only after this may they be sent outside Ukraine for training and other military needs.

Reservists who have not taken the military oath previously take it during training camps or upon mobilization.

### **Article 3. Alternative (nonmilitary) service**

Alternative (nonmilitary) service is state service outside the Armed Forces of Ukraine or other forces introduced to replace military service.

The right to alternative (nonmilitary) service as a way of fulfilling the universal military obligation is granted to citizens of Ukraine who have true religious convictions and belong to religious organizations that are valid under the law whose teachings do not allow them to use weapons or serve in the armed forces.

### **Article 4. Staffing the armed forces and other forces with military servicemen**

The Armed Forces of Ukraine and other forces are staffed through the military commissariats by:

- inducting citizens into military service on the basis of their universal military obligation
- recruiting citizens into the military service under contract.

In order to complete the staffing of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other forces with personnel for mobilization during war time, a reserve is created.

The procedure for staffing the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other forces with military servicemen is determined by the present law and other legislative acts of Ukraine.

#### **Article 5. Composition of military servicemen and reservists**

Military servicemen and reservists are divided into enlisted personnel, noncommissioned officers, warrant officers, and officer personnel.

Officer personnel are divided into junior officer personnel, senior officer personnel, and general officer personnel.

Each military serviceman and reservist is assigned a military rank. Military ranks in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other forces are divided into Army and Navy.

The following military ranks are established.

Army	Navy
<b>Enlisted personnel</b>	
Private	Seaman
Senior Private	Senior Seaman
<b>Noncommissioned Officers</b>	
Junior Sergeant	Petty Officer 2d Class
Senior Sergeant	Petty Officer 1st Class
Ranking NCO	Chief Petty Officer
<b>Warrant officers</b>	
Warrant Officer	Warrant Officer
Senior Warrant Officer	Senior Warrant Officer
<b>Junior Officer Personnel</b>	
Junior Lieutenant	Junior Lieutenant
Lieutenant	Lieutenant
Senior Lieutenant	Senior Lieutenant
Captain	Captain-Lieutenant
<b>Senior Officer Personnel</b>	
Major	Captain 3d Rank
Lieutenant Colonel	Captain 2d Rank
Colonel	Captain 1st Rank
<b>General Officer Personnel</b>	
Major General	Rear Admiral
Lieutenant General	Vice Admiral
Colonel General	Admiral
<b>GENERAL OF THE ARMY OF UKRAINE</b>	

2. [As Published] Added to the military ranks of citizens in the reserve or retirement are the words "reserve" or "in retirement," respectively.

3. Military ranks are conferred according to the Statute on Performance of Military Service by Citizens of Ukraine, which is approved by the president.

4. Individuals are stripped of military rank by officials authorized to confer military ranks and also through a court sentence in cases where military servicemen discredit their honor and dignity.

Military servicemen in compulsory service (except those with the rank of private or seaman) may be stripped of their military rank according to the procedure outlined by the Disciplinary Regulations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

5. The military rank is restored in keeping with the Statute on Performance of Military Service by Citizens of Ukraine.

#### **Article 6. Military positions**

1. Military positions (staff positions to be filled by military servicemen) and the military ranks corresponding to them are specified in the staffs of military units, ships, administrative organs, institutions, and military training institutions.

The list of positions to be filled by general officer personnel is approved by the president of Ukraine, and positions for other military servicemen—by the minister of defense of Ukraine.

2. Military positions are divided into:

- positions for enlisted men
- positions for noncommissioned officers
- positions for warrant officers
- positions for officer personnel.

3. The minister of defense of Ukraine is approved by the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine on the recommendation of the president of Ukraine.

The appointment of military servicemen to military positions of deputy ministers of defense of Ukraine in command of forces of military districts and operational commands, commander of the Air Force of Ukraine, and commander of the Navy of Ukraine is done by the president of Ukraine on the recommendation of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.

The rights of officials with respect to the procedure for appointment to other positions are determined by the minister of defense of Ukraine.

4. With their consent military servicemen may be temporarily assigned to organs of state power and administration, ministries, and departments to perform work of a defense nature while remaining in the military service and also retaining the rights to social protection based on the corresponding decision of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

5. The transfer of military servicemen from certain positions to others is outlined by the Statute on Performance of Military Service by Citizens of Ukraine.

#### **Article 7. The military uniform and insignia of military servicemen**

1. Military servicemen and also reservists during conferences wear a military uniform with insignia in keeping with their military ranks and branch of forces (service).

The military uniform and insignia of military servicemen and the special insignia of the General of the Army of Ukraine are established by the president of Ukraine. The

rules for wearing them are approved by the minister of defense of Ukraine, for the National Guard of Ukraine and the Border Troops of Ukraine—by their commander, for the Security Service of Ukraine—by its chairman, and for the Administration for Protection of High Officials of Ukraine—by its chief. For other military formations these are established by their chiefs.

2. Introducing uniforms and insignia similar to the uniforms and insignia of military servicemen for workers and employees is prohibited, regardless of the departments in which they work.

3. The wearing of the military uniform by unauthorized individuals and also the degradation of the military uniform and insignia of military servicemen or mocking them are prosecuted in keeping with existing legislation.

## CHAPTER II.

### Training of Citizens for Military Service

#### Article 8. Training of pre-inductees and inductees for military service

1. Work is done with pre-inductees and inductees in relation to their training for military service, which includes pre-induction training of young men, training of inductees in military-technical specialties, preparation for entry into military training institutions, military training of students of higher educational institutions in the program for reserve officers, physical training, health improvement work, raising the general educational level, study of the state language, and patriotic education.

2. The organization of the training of pre-inductees and inductees for military service is conducted under the leadership of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea, ministries and departments of Ukraine which have training and educational institutions, organs of local state administration and local self-government, which use funds allotted by the Ministry of Defense, and other military formations.

Control over the organization, performance, and results of training of pre-inductees and inductees for military service in the country and program and methodological support for pre-induction training are provided by the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and also ministries and departments of Ukraine which have jurisdiction over training and educational institutions.

#### Article 9. Pre-induction training

Pre-induction training includes military, military-technical, physical, and psychological training of pre-inductees and is conducted in two pre-graduation classes (courses) of training-educational institutions according to special programs approved by the Ministry of Education of Ukraine and coordinated with the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.

Young men who have not been through pre-induction training in training-educational institutions, who have not been certified or received an unsatisfactory grade in this subject, after graduation from training-educational institutions and before being called up for compulsory service go through pre-induction training under the leadership of

organs of local state administration and local self-government in defense-sports health camps with leave from production, and during wartime—in enterprises, institutions, and organizations through field training sessions.

Cadres of military instructors of training-educational institutions are included on the staff of the rayon (city) military commissariats.

#### Article 10. Training of inductees in military specialties

Training of inductees in military-technical specialties is conducted:

- among students of vocational training-educational institutions in profiles related to military training specialties, in these institutions themselves
- among workers and temporarily unemployed individuals and also students of vocational training-educational institutions studying in profiles not related to military-training specialties, in training organizations of the Society for Contributing to the Defense of Ukraine, in vocational and technical schools, and in vocational schools at various levels.

Training is provided for inductees who have reached 17 years of age and are fit for military service in terms of their health, who are subject to being inducted into military service upon completion of their education.

The number of inductees subject to training in military-technical specialties and also the list of specialties and training programs are determined by the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine in conjunction with involved ministries and departments of Ukraine, and they are approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

#### Article 11. Military training of students (cadets) of educational institutions

1. Following the program for reserve officers, military training of students (cadets) of higher educational institutions (day forms of education) is conducted for men up to 27 years of age who are fit for military service in terms of their health, and military medical training is also given to women students of higher medical training institutions.

Enrollment in the military department (faculty for military training, department for military training) is done under voluntary conditions in keeping with personal requests on a basis determined by contract.

The development and approval of the military training program are the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine in conjunction with the Ministry of Education of Ukraine and other involved organs of state government.

The period of military training counts as compulsory service.

Individuals who have not served on active duty or performed alternative (nonmilitary) service or been through training in a military department (faculty for military training, department for military training), after graduation from a higher educational institutions are inducted for compulsory duty mainly in their specialties.

2. Students (cadets) who have been through the entire course of military training under a program for reserve officers and have taken placement examinations are assigned the appropriate initial military officer rank.

Individuals who have not been through this training or are not certified as officer personnel are not assigned an initial military officer rank.

3. The list of military specialties in which reserve officer training is conducted is determined and approved by the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine with the agreement of the Ministry of Education of Ukraine.

4. The list of educational institutions in which military training of students (cadets) is conducted and the procedure for conducting it are determined by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. Military departments (faculties of military training, departments of military training) are structural subdivisions of higher educational institutions. Military training is one of the main kinds of training and is included in the training plans of higher educational institutions as an independent training discipline.

Ministries and departments of Ukraine which have training-educational institutions in conjunction with the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine determine the staff distribution and create the necessary training-material base for military training. Financing of military training is provided under a separate item at the expense of the budget of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and other military formations.

The Ministry of Defense of Ukraine selects military cadres (of military training faculties and military training departments) and, in conjunction with the Ministry of Education of Ukraine and the rectors of higher educational institutions, appoints them to the corresponding staff positions, and it also supervises the military training of the students (cadets).

5. During training camps (on-the-job training) the rights and responsibilities established by legislation of Ukraine for military servicemen called up for training extend to the students (cadets).

**Article 12. Preparation for entry into military training institutions. Physical training. Therapeutic-health work. Raising the level of general educational training. Study of the state language. Patriotic education**

1. Citizens who have expressed a desire to enter military training institutions go through training in military academies, in secondary, general educational training institutions, in organizations of the Society for Contributing to the Defense of Ukraine, in training course at higher educational institutions, or independently.

2. Physical training of pre-inductees and inductees is organized according to the physical culture program by organs of the state administration for education, physical culture, and sports, sports societies and clubs in training-educational institutions, defense-sports health camps, and at enterprises, institutions, and organizations, regardless of their jurisdiction or form of ownership.

3. Therapeutic-health work with youth is organized in their place of residence, training, or work by public health organs and institutions in therapeutic, therapeutic-preventive, and therapeutic-health institutions with the formation of adolescent offices within them.

Medical examinations of young men 15-17 years of age are conducted annually by physician-specialists enlisted for medical examination of inductees. If necessary, medical treatment and health measures are prescribed for the young men.

4. Organs for state administration of education take the necessary measures for raising the level of education and providing for general educational training of youth with pre-induction and induction status, and they organize other measures for the study of the state language by youth who have a poor mastery of it or do not speak it at all.

**Article 13. Rights and responsibilities of citizens in pre-induction and induction training**

1. Citizens going through training for military service in defense-sports health camps and training organizations of the Society for Contributing to the Defense of Ukraine with leave from production retain their job, position, and average earnings during all the time they are performing these duties, including travel time in both directions.

Costs of renting housing for the period of training of the aforementioned citizens, the cost of travel to the place of training (conferences) and back, and their average earnings for this period are paid by the military commissariats that sent these citizens for training for military service.

2. Class attendance and other measures for preparing young men for military service are mandatory for citizens sent by military commissariats to defense-sports health camps for pre-induction training and for acquiring military-technical specialties.

### CHAPTER III

**Registration of citizens in draft districts, induction and admission (reporting) for military service**

**Article 14. Registration of citizens with draft boards**

1. The registration of citizens with draft boards is conducted in order to place youths on the rosters, to determine their numbers and degree of readiness for military service, and to establish their general educational level, knowledge of specialties, and level of physical training.

Draft boards are formed in the rayons (cities) in order to register citizens.

2. Each year during January-March citizens who have reached 17 years of age during the year are registered with the draft boards. The registration is conducted by rayon (city) military commissariats in the place of residence.

Medical examinations of citizens registered with draft boards are conducted in keeping with the Statute on Medical Examination in the Armed Forces of Ukraine approved by the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine with the agreement of the Ministry of Public Health of Ukraine.

Reporting to therapeutic-preventive and therapeutic institutions in keeping with decisions of draft boards is mandatory for citizen-inductees.

3. Housing operations organizations and enterprises, institutions, and organizations in charge of buildings, regardless of their jurisdiction or forms of ownership, home owners, organs of local state administration and local self-government responsible for initial registration of reservists and inductees, personnel departments of enterprises, institutions, and organizations, regardless of their jurisdiction and forms of ownership, and educational institutions each year by the deadlines set by the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine submit to the corresponding rayon (city) military commissariats lists of youths eligible for registration with draft boards.

4. Citizens are obliged to report to the military commissariat for registration with their draft board by the deadline indicated in the summons by the military commissariat and submit the necessary documents.

5. In order to conduct registration of citizens with draft boards, the corresponding boards are created in the rayons (cities), which consist of:

- the chairman of the board—the rayon (city) commissar;
- members of the board: physicians participating in medical examination of pre-inductees, the chief of the group for professional psychological selection of the military commissariat, and the secretary of the board.

The personnel of the rayon (city) board for registration and the procedure for conducting and supporting this work are approved annually by the head of the local state administration or the chairman of the executive committee of the corresponding soviet of people's deputies.

6. Rayon (city) registration boards are responsible for:

- organization of medical certification of pre-inductees called to the board and determination of their fitness of use in the military service;
- discovery and preliminary selection of candidates to be sent to military training institutions;
- efficient distribution of individuals who are fit in terms of medical, psychological, and other indicators for training in training organizations of the Society for Contributing to the Defense of Ukraine and professional training and educational institutions in programs for training inductees in military technical specialties;
- admission to therapeutic-preventive and therapeutic institutions and courses for individuals who at the time of induction are in need of examination, treatment, or medical observation;
- admission to the corresponding training-educational institutions and courses for individuals with poor general educational training and also those who do not speak the state language or speak it poorly.

7. Citizens registered with draft boards are considered to be inductees, they are issued certificates of registration, and

they are given explanations of their rights and responsibilities, the rules of military registration, and the procedure for taking training for military service. Citizens are placed on the military rosters from the moment they are registered.

#### **Article 15. Induction age. Induction of citizens for active duty**

1. During peacetime citizens eligible in terms of age and health are called up for compulsory service if they are 18 years of age by the day of their departure for their military units.

Citizens are called up for compulsory service twice a year on the basis of an ukase of the president of Ukraine. The ukase of the president of Ukraine is published in the mass media no later than a month before the beginning of the induction.

After the publication of the ukase of the president of Ukraine each inductee, including those on the temporary rosters, must report to the proper point at the time indicated by the military commissariat in the announcement. Citizens of induction age who have not served on active duty and have not been on the military rosters without legal justification, and also inductees who have temporarily left their permanent place of residence for another location and have not been placed on the military rolls there must report to the military commissariat in their place of residence within seven days.

2. Leaders of enterprises, institutions, and organizations, kolkhozes and cooperatives, and training-educational institutions, regardless of their jurisdiction and forms of ownership, are obligated to call inductees back from business trips so that they may report promptly to their draft board.

3. Inductees 18 years of age and older are allowed to change their place of military registration before the publication of the ukase of the president of Ukraine on the next induction. After this, it is possible only in certain cases under the condition that the military commissariat receives documents certifying that the inductee:

- has moved to a job in a different locality
- has moved to a new place of residence
- has been admitted to an educational institution and is there to continue his education or has completed an educational institution and is being sent to work through official placement.

4. Valid reasons for citizens' failure to report to the draft boards established by the military commissar are:

- a citizen's illness which makes it impossible for him to report personally to the indicated point;
- the death or serious illness of a close relative;
- obstacles of nature or other circumstances that make it impossible for an individual to report personally to the given place at the given time.

The reasons for the failure to report must be confirmed by the corresponding documents.

5. During peacetime the following citizens are not subject to induction for compulsory service:

- those exempted from registration in keeping with Article 18 of the present law;
- those on whom an inquiry or preliminary investigation is being conducted or a criminal case is being considered by the court—until the corresponding decisions are made—and also citizens who have been convicted and sentenced to prison.

6. Registration for compulsory service of male citizens of Ukraine who are temporarily living abroad is carried out according to the procedure established by the present law if they have a permanent residence in Ukraine.

#### Article 16. Draft boards

1. In order to draft citizens for compulsory service in the rayons (cities) draft boards are formed, consisting of:

Chairman of the board—deputy head of the local state administration or deputy chairman of the executive committee of the corresponding soviet of people's deputies.

Members of the board:

- the rayon (city) commissar;
- the deputy chief of the rayon (city) internal affairs department;
- the physician organizing the work of medical personnel for medical certification of inductees;
- the secretary of the board;
- representatives of collectives of enterprises, institutions, and organizations, public organizations and associations, and training-educational institutions.

2. The personnel of the rayon (city) draft board and the schedule for inducting citizens for compulsory military service are approved by the head of the local state administration or the chairman of the executive committee of the corresponding soviet of people's deputies.

3. The rayon (city) draft boards are responsible for:

- organizing medical examination of inductees;
- making the decision to induct citizens for compulsory military service and alternative (nonmilitary) service;
- granting draft deferments or exemption from the draft of compulsory military service;
- making decisions to send inductees who have expressed a desire to enter military training institutions to take entrance examinations or to refuse to send these individuals to the examinations because of the condition of their health or an unsatisfactory general educational level or moral qualities;
- making decisions to send to investigation organs materials on inductees who have refused to report for compulsory military service.

4. For leadership and supervision of the activity of rayon (city) draft boards in the Republic of Crimea, the oblasts, and the cities of Kiev and Sevastopol, the corresponding Crimean Republic, oblast, and city draft boards are created.

The personnel of the Republic of Crimea, oblast, and Kiev and Sevastopol city draft boards are approved by the

Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea and the head of the local state administration, respectively.

These draft boards are responsible for:

- organizing medical monitoring of individuals drafted into compulsory military service until they are sent to their military units and also individuals who have questioned the results of the medical examination and decisions of the rayon (city) draft boards;
- verifying the correctness of granting deferments or exemptions from the draft;
- checking on the justification of the military-professional assignments of inductees, taking into account their experience, abilities, interests, and personal capabilities;
- considering complaints from citizens about the actions of rayon (city) draft boards.

The draft boards of the Republic of Crimea, the oblasts, and the cities of Kiev and Sevastopol have the right to revise and override decisions of the rayon (city) draft boards.

5. All citizens drafted into military service undergo a mandatory medical examination.

6. In keeping with the results of the inductee's medical examination, his moral and professional qualities, and also the material and social situation of the inductee and members of his family, the rayon (city) draft board makes and informs the inductee of its decision:

- about his suitability for military service and induction into military service with an assignment to a branch of the Armed Forces of Ukraine or other forces, and also determines the date of his departure for service in the Armed Forces of Ukraine or other military formations;
- about temporary unfitness for military service because of health;
- about the granting of a deferment or exemption from the draft for compulsory military service on grounds specified by Articles 17 and 18 of the present law;
- about unfitness because of health for military service during peacetime, restriction of ability during wartime, and registration in the reserve;
- about unfitness for military service with removal from the military rosters.

A decision of the draft board may be appealed to the draft board of a higher level or to the court according to the procedure determined by legislation.

#### Article 17. Draft deferment

1. Deferment of induction into compulsory military service is offered to citizens by a decision of the rayon (city) draft board: because of family circumstances, because of health, for continuation of education, and in connection with deputy activity. This kind of deferment is also granted to inductees who are teachers with higher pedagogical education for the entire period of their employment in rural schools.

2. A draft deferment because of family circumstances is granted to inductees who have:

a) a disabled mother and father or a single disabled father or single disabled mother if they have no other able-bodied individuals living with them who are obligated under the law to support them. The disability of the parents is determined according to the procedure specified by legislation in effect

b) brothers and sisters under 18 years of age if they are not working or older if the latter, regardless of their age, are disabled persons of groups I or II, if there are no other individuals who could take them on as dependents.

A draft deferment because of family circumstances is also granted to inductees who have as dependents:

- a child under three years of age or older than three years if it is being raised without a mother
- two or more children
- a disabled child
- unemployed individuals who are dependent on the inductee because of the death of parents, prolonged illness, or other valid reasons for five years.

A draft deferment is granted to inductees for the time they are caring for disabled persons of groups I and II who have disturbances of the craniocerebral circulatory system or spinal injury and are confined to bed.

If there are two sons in the family, the draft deferment because of family circumstances for a period of up to three years is granted to the inductee whose brother is performing compulsory military service.

If two sons are subject to the draft at the same time, the deferment is granted to one of them at the request and suggestion of the parents.

3. A draft deferment on grounds of health is granted for a period of up to one year to inductees who are deemed at the time of the medical examination to be temporarily unfit for military service.

4. A draft deferment for continuation of education is granted to inductees studying in secondary general educational and vocational training-educational institutions—until they acquire a complete general secondary education, but not if they are older than 21—and to students studying in higher educational institutions with leave from production (except for colleges, tekhnikums and schools on an equal footing with them)—until graduation.

A draft deferment for a period of up to three years is granted to graduates of vocational training-educational institutions at their request after graduation in order to acquire practical vocational skills under production conditions.

A draft deferment is also granted to graduates of vocational training-educational and higher educational institutions after their graduation, under the condition that they work in rural localities.

Students in secular and religious higher educational institutions are granted draft deferments once during their entire period of education.

5. Draft deferments because of deputy activity are granted to inductees who are people's deputies for the period of their deputy authority.

6. Draft deferments are also granted:

- to inductees who have been resettled from disaster regions for no more than two years from the time of their resettlement by a decision of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine
- in the event that the inductees independently or in conjunction with their parents run peasant (farmer-run) farms, but for no more than three years from the time they acquire the land
- in other cases not specified by the present law in keeping with decisions of the draft board of the Republic of Crimea, oblast, and the Kiev and Sevastopol draft boards—at the request of the rayon (city) draft boards.

7. Inductees who have lost their grounds for obtaining a deferment and also individuals who do not have the right to a deferment or grounds for exemption from the draft specified by Article 17 of the present law and who for various reasons have not been called up for compulsory military service must within the established time periods be called up for service during the next draft before they reach 27 years of age by the day of departure.

#### **Article 18. Exemption from induction for compulsory military service**

The following inductees are exempt from the draft for compulsory military service during peacetime:

- those unfit for military service during peacetime because of their health
- those not called up for compulsory military or alternative (nonmilitary) service before they reach 27 years of age
- those who are ordained and employed in one of the registered religious faiths
- those living permanently abroad if they do not have a residence in Ukraine
- those whose blood brothers and sisters have been killed, have died, or have been disabled during compulsory military service. Inductees with the right to exemption from the draft on this basis may choose not to take advantage of it.

Citizens who have completed a course of training in educational institutions of internal affairs organs and are continuing their service in the system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine are also exempt from the draft.

#### **Article 19. Induction of reserve officers into military service**

Reserve officers under 30 years of age who have not been through compulsory military service and do not have grounds for a draft deferment may be called up during peacetime by an order of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine to do military service in positions of officer personnel.

**Article 20. Acceptance for military service under contract**

1. Individuals meeting the requirements for military service are accepted for military on a voluntary basis:

- enlisted, noncommissioned officer, and senior noncommissioned officer military servicemen who have served upon induction for no less than one year and have the appropriate professional training in a specialty—for military service of privates, seamen, noncommissioned officers, and senior noncommissioned officers under contract
- women from 19 to 35 years of age—for military service in positions of enlisted, noncommissioned officer, and senior noncommissioned officer personnel
- enlisted, noncommissioned officer, and senior noncommissioned officer personnel who have served compulsory service for no less than a year, reservists who do not have military officer ranks, and also women with the corresponding special training and with higher or secondary specialized education from 19 to 25 years of age—for military service as warrant officers
- citizens from 17 to 21 years of age, including those who reached 17 years of age in the year of registration for training and also military servicemen and reservists from 18 to 23 years of age who do not have military officer ranks and have expressed a desire to train in military training institutions—for military service as students in military training institutions
- students in military training institutions and reserve officers—for military service as officer personnel
- reserve officers who have not reached the maximum age for military service and women under 35 years of age who have been assigned military officer ranks—for military service as officer personnel.

2. Citizens accepted for military service undergo a mandatory medical examination.

3. In the event they are accepted for military service a contract is concluded between the state and the citizen, the form of which is determined by the statute on military service by citizens of Ukraine.

4. Enlisted, noncommissioned officer, and senior noncommissioned officer personnel, warrant officers and also women serving under contract, depending on their qualifications and periods of service, are assigned class categories—from first to third and the highest, masters, with the corresponding system of pay incentives.

**Article 21. Material support for citizens in connection with induction or acceptance for military service**

1. Citizens inducted or accepted for military service are paid severance pay in the amount of two months' wages in keeping with existing legislation of Ukraine.

2. Citizens, when performing duties related to acceptance for the military rosters, induction, or acceptance for military service, and also citizens who enter military training institutions or are sent by military commissariats for outpatient

or inpatient examination (therapy, medical evaluation) are released from work for the time necessary for performing these duties, travel to the educational institution and back, taking entrance examinations, and spending time in the medical institution, while their job, position, and average earnings are retained for them.

In this case the payment of the average earnings to the citizens and their transportation to the location for taking their entrance examinations and also, for individuals inducted or accepted for military service, to the location of their service and their food en route are made from the funds of the Ministry of Education of Ukraine and other military formations.

**CHAPTER IV.**

**Performing military service**

**Article 22. Procedure for performing military service, maximum age for being in military service**

1. The procedure for the performance of military service by citizens of Ukraine is determined by the present law, the Statute on Performance of Military Service by Citizens of Ukraine, and other legislative acts.

2. The maximum age for military service is established:

- a) for privates and seamen, noncommissioned officers, and ranking noncommissioned officers in compulsory service—29 years;
- b) for women in the military service in positions of enlisted, noncommissioned officer, and senior noncommissioned officer personnel—40 years;
- c) for junior officers—40 years;
- d) for senior officers: major and lieutenant colonel—45 years, colonel—50 years;
- e) for general officers: in military ranks up to lieutenant general inclusive and those equal to them—55 years, colonel general and those equal to them—60 years, and general of the army of the Ukraine—65 years.

Officers who are candidates of sciences (docents) and also officers with higher vocational training who have practical work experience in the positions they hold and whose health is suitable for military service may have their period of service extended by the minister of defense of Ukraine up to five years, and doctors of sciences (professors)—up to 10 years.

Military servicemen who have reached the maximum age for being in the military service are subject to discharge into the reserve according to the procedure determined by the Statute on Performance of Military Service by Citizens of Ukraine. Officers, warrant officers, and women in the military service in positions of privates and seamen, noncommissioned officers and senior noncommissioned officers whose contracts have expired and who have reached the maximum age for being in the military service may remain in it, with their consent, after the conclusion of a new contract but no longer than until they reach the maximum age for being in the reserve for the corresponding military servicemen specified by Article 28 of the present law.

**Article 23. Period of military service**

Calendar periods of military service are established as follows:

- a) for privates and seamen, noncommissioned officers and senior noncommissioned officers performing compulsory military service—18 months (for individuals with higher education—12 months), and those performing military service under contract—three years;
- b) for women in the military service in positions of privates and seamen, noncommissioned officers and senior noncommissioned officers—no less than three years;
- c) for warrant officers—no less than five years;
- d) for officers—from five to 10 years under the first contract;
- e) for officers called into military service from the reserve—two years, and for those who voluntarily entered military service from the reserve—no less than three years.

Upon completion of the periods of military service established by the present article it can be extended under a new contract for a period of no less than three years each until the attainment of the maximum age for being in the military service.

**Article 24. Beginning and ending of military service**

1. The beginning of the military service is considered to be:

- the day of arrival at the military commissariat for departure for the military unit—for inductees and officers called up from the reserve;
- the day of departure to the place of service indicated in the orders issued by the military commissariat—for reservists and women;
- the day of arrival for training in the military training institution (military lyceum) for pre-inductees, inductees, and reservists indicated in the orders issued by the military commissariat.

2. The end of the military service is considered to be the day on which the military serviceman is placed on the military roster in the military commissariat as discharged from the military service, dismissed from the military training institution, or graduated from the training institution or training camps, but no later than the date indicated in the order.

**Article 25. Military service of cadets (auditors) of military training institutions**

1. Citizens studying in military training institutions who are in military service and do not have the rank of warrant officers or officer personnel are cadets with these ranks—auditors.

Training in military training institutions is credited to cadets as compulsory military service.

2. Citizens who do not have a military rank before entering the military training institution are assigned the military rank of private or seaman after registration for training. Other military ranks conferred before entering the military training institutions are retained.

Cadets enjoy the rights, privileges, and advantages and are assigned responsibilities in keeping with existing legislation and the regulations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Upon completion of the first course, contracts are concluded with cadets on an individual basis for their performance of military service upon completion of the military training institution in positions of officer personnel for a period of from five to 10 years. Cadets who do not conclude such a contract are dismissed from military training institutions.

Cadets who are graduates of higher military training institutions and military departments (military training faculties, military training divisions), and secular higher educational institutions with baccalaureate degree are assigned the initial officer rank of junior lieutenant, and with masters degree—lieutenant.

3. Cadets who are dismissed from military training institutions:

- are transferred into the reserve if they have served the established time of compulsory military service;
- sent for one year to military units for further military service if they have not served the established time of compulsory military service.

**Article 26. Discharge from military service**

1. Military servicemen are discharged from the military service:

- a) into the reserve if the military servicemen have not reached the maximum age for being in the reserve and in terms of their health are fit for military service during peace or wartime;
- b) into retirement if the military servicemen have reached the maximum age for being in the reserve or have been declared by military medical commissions to be unfit for military service because of their health with removal from the military rosters.

2. Discharges from the service are given:

- to military servicemen in compulsory service who have served the established times—on the basis of an ukase of the president of Ukraine;
- to military servicemen who have served under contract—upon expiration of this period.

3. Military servicemen in compulsory service are discharged early from the service:

- for health reasons—on the basis of a conclusion (decree) of the military medical commission;
- because of family circumstances—in the event that they gain the right to a deferment as a result of a change in family circumstances;
- because of being sentenced to prison.

4. If necessary, military servicemen in compulsory military service who have served the established amount of time may be retained in the military service for a period of up to two months by a decision of the president of Ukraine.

5. Military servicemen discharged from compulsory military service into the reserve or retirement are provided with a uniform in good repair according to a list established by the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, travel document to their place of residence, food for the time they are en route, and a monetary stipend in the amount of two months' wages.

Military servicemen in compulsory service and cadets of military training institutions who are discharged (dismissed) from military service (training institutions) because of health or family circumstances retain the right to their previous job (position) for three months from the day they were inducted or registered for military service, not counting the time for travel to the place of permanent residence.

At the request of military servicemen in compulsory service they may be discharged into the reserve in their own civilian clothing.

6. Military servicemen performing military service under contract in positions of privates and seamen, noncommissioned officers and senior noncommissioned officers may be discharged from the military service:

- a) after serving their designated term;
- b) because of their age—if they reach the maximum age for performing military service. Certain categories of military servicemen with their consent may be discharged from the military service because of age if they have five years or less left before reaching the established maximum age under the condition that they have the right to a pension for length of service;
- c) because of health—on the basis of the conclusion (decree) of the military medical commission that they are unfit or have limited fitness for military service;
- d) because of reduction of the staffs or organizational measures if it is impossible to use them in the service;
- e) upon expiration of the contract or its dissolution;
- f) because of family circumstances or other important reasons, the list of which is determined by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine;
- g) because of unsuitability for service;
- h) because of a court sentence which has legal force.

Additionally, officers with no less than five years in the service in positions as officer personnel may be discharged from the military service at their own request.

## CHAPTER V.

### Service in the reserve.

#### Article 27. Registration in the reserve. Categories of the reserve

1. Citizens discharged from military service and also those exempted from the draft for compulsory military service (except those removed from the rosters because of health) are registered in the reserve.

2. The reserve is divided into the first and second categories.

The first category of reserve includes military servicemen who have served in the military service and acquired a military occupation specialty during this period.

The second category of reserve includes reservists who have not acquired a military occupation specialty during military service or have not been called up for military service.

Military servicemen included in the second category of reserve, if they have acquired a military occupation specialty at training camps or in the corresponding civilian occupation while in the reserve, are transferred to the first category of reserve. Women accepted for the military rosters are in the second category of reserve.

3. Individuals registered in the reserve may be sent periodically for medical examination. Also, military servicemen transferred to the reserve because of their health without performing military service, if they are declared to be fit for military service before they are 27 years of age, are placed on the roster of inductees and are subject to being called up for compulsory military service on a general basis.

#### Article 28. Maximum age for being in the reserve. Categories of reserve

1. Reservists are divided into three categories according to age. The categories are established on the basis of being in the reserve.

The maximum age for being in the third category of reserve is the maximum age for the reserve in general.

2. Privates and seamen, noncommissioned officers and senior noncommissioned officers, and warrant officers are in the reserve until they reach the following maximum ages:

- first category—35 years;
- second category—45 years;
- third category—50 years.

3. Officers are in the reserve until the following maximum ages:

a) in the first category of reserve:

- junior officers—45 years;
- senior officers—50 years;
- general officers—55 years;

b) in the second category of reserve:

- junior officers—50 years;
- senior officers—55 years;
- general officers—60 years;

c) in the third category of reserve:

- junior officers—55 years;
- senior officers—60 years;
- general officers—65 years,
- and those with the military rank of General of the Army of Ukraine—70 years.

4. Female reservists, regardless of their military ranks, are included in the third category of reserve. The maximum age for them to be in the reserve is set: for officers—50 years, for other female reservists—45 years.

#### **Article 29. Holding training camps**

1. While reservists are in the reserve they are called to conferences: training (or inspection) and special.

The rights and responsibilities of reservists called to the conferences follow from the conditions for military service and are established by the present law.

2. Reservists who do not have military ranks as officers are called up by the military commissariats to training camps:

- of the first category—up to five times for a period of two months each time;
- of the second category—up to three times for a period of up to one month each time;
- of the third category—one time for a period of up to 15 days.

Reserve officer personnel who are not doing compulsory military service may be called up for training camps while they are in the reserve:

- of the first category—one time for a period of up to two months;
- of the second category—two times for a period of up to one month each;
- of the third category—one time for a period of 15 days.

3. The time and duration of training camps for reservists are determined by the minister of defense of Ukraine in keeping with the present law.

4. During the periods between training camps, according to the plan of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, reservists may be called to inspection conferences for a period of up to 10 days both with and without leave from production.

5. The overall time of conferences while in the reserve may not exceed 10 months. And the time spent at inspection conferences is included in the overall period of time spent in training camps.

6. Reservists may be called up by a decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine to special conferences in order to participate in preventing emergency situations or to eliminate consequences which threaten or could threaten the normal living conditions of all or part of the country's population, for a period of no more than two months.

7. Reservists who are called to conferences, during the time spent at them, are provided with goods and money according to the procedure and in the amounts established by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. Reservists who are called to conferences retain their jobs, positions, and average earnings during the entire period of the conferences, include the travel time to the place and back. The average earnings are paid from funds of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and other military formations.

These individuals are not subject to being dismissed on the initiative of the owner or administration of the enterprise, institution, or organization, regardless of their jurisdiction and forms of ownership, except in cases when they are completely eliminated.

If the reservist has become ill during the conferences or continues to be ill after they are concluded, his job and position are retained for him, and after the day of the completion of the conference, in addition to wages, he is paid a stipend for temporary disability in keeping with existing legislation.

Reservists who are temporarily unemployed on the day they are called to the conferences retain the right to payment specified by employment legislation. During the entire period of the conferences, including the travel time to the place where they are held and back, these workers are paid the amount of the minimum wage in the place where the conferences are held.

#### **Article 30. Exemption from training camps**

The following are exempted from training camps:

- a) engineering and technical personnel, workers, and employees working in the system of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and other military formations.
- b) flight and technical personnel and workers and employees of the Ukrainian civil aviation association who work directly in transportation and are employed in service and repair of aircraft and airport equipment, and also aviation training centers of the society for contributing to the defense of Ukraine.
- c) shipboard personnel of ships of the sea and river fleets and the fishing industry fleet during the navigation period;
- d) individuals working in agriculture and also those employed at enterprises for repair of agricultural equipment—during the periods of planting and harvesting work;
- e) pedagogical personnel of higher and secondary educational and vocational training-educational institutions and training organizations of the society for contributing to the defense of Ukraine—during the period when classes are conducted;
- f) students of higher educational institutions with the evening form of training, graduate students, and doctoral candidates—during the period of the examination sessions;
- g) female reservists;
- h) reservists for a year after discharge into the reserve;
- i) reservists with children under 14 years of age or three or more children under 16 years of age;
- j) reservists in connection with deputy activity.

In certain cases when there are valid reasons and the reservists submit the proper supporting documents, a decision for exemption from training camps is made by the rayon (city) military commissar when they are on the military roster.

**Article 31. Conferring military ranks in the event of discharge into the reserve**

Reservists who have been through training camps and taken examinations in the training program may be assigned military titles in the reserve according to the procedure established by the statute on military service by citizens of Ukraine.

**Article 32. Transfer of reservists to retirement**

Reservists who have reached the maximum age for being in the reserve and also those deemed by medical examination commissions to be unfit for military service are removed from the military roster and transferred to retirement.

**CHAPTER VI.**

**Military registration of reservists and inductees**

**Article 33. General rules for military registration**

All reservists and inductees are subject to military registration.

Military registration of reservists and inductees is a state-wide system of registration and analysis of inductee resources in the state who are fit for military service. The functioning of the system of military registration is provided for by organs of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, the local state administration, and organs of local self-government.

Military registration of all reservists and inductees is conducted in the place of their residence and is divided into general, special, personal-qualification, and personal-primary registration.

**Article 34. General and special registration**

The general military registration includes inductees and also reservists who have not been reserved by enterprises, institutions, and organizations for the period of mobilization and during wartime.

There is a special military registration for reservists who are assigned according to the established policy to enterprises, institutions, and organizations for the period of mobilization and wartime.

**Article 35. Personal-qualification and personal-primary registration**

Personal-qualification registration of all reservists and inductees is the responsibility of the rayon (city) military commissariats.

Personal-primary registration of reservists and inductees in rural locations, villages, and cities where there are no military commissariats is the responsibility of organs of local self-government and is done by them.

Personal registration of reservists and inductees who are working or studying is the responsibility of the enterprises, institutions, and organizations and training institutions, regardless of their jurisdiction and form of ownership, and their leaders (owners) are responsible for the condition of this work.

**Article 36. Military registration of citizens of Ukraine living abroad**

Military registration of citizens of Ukraine temporarily living abroad is done by diplomatic and consular representatives of Ukraine. Diplomatic and consular representatives must ensure that male Ukrainian citizens who have reached 18 years of age report to the military commissariats in their place of permanent residence for induction into the military service.

**Article 37. Placement on and removal from military rosters**

1. In order to provide for military registration all military servicemen and individuals inducted or released into the reserve must report to the rayon (city) military commissariats within three days after their return to their place of residence.

2. If there is a change of the place of residence for a period of more than a month and a half or departure for business trips, training, vacation, or treatment for more than three months, reservists and inductees must be removed from the military rosters in their place of residence, and after they have arrived at their new permanent or temporary place of residence they must be placed on the military rosters within three days.

During wartime reservists and inductees are forbidden to leave their place of permanent residence without permission from the rayon (city) military commissariat.

3. Military registration and removal from the military rosters of officers living in population points distant from military commissariats may be carried out by organs of local self-government, which are responsible for personal-primary registration according to the procedure established by the rayon (city) military commissariat.

4. The following citizens are subject to removal from the military rosters:

a) those deemed by military medical commissions to be unfit for military service with a removal from military rosters;

b) those who have reached the maximum age for being in the reserve;

c) those who have been called up or accepted into the military service;

d) those who have left for permanent residence outside Ukraine;

e) those who have died.

**Article 38. Obligations of state organs, enterprises, institutions, and organizations, officials, and reservists for following the rules of military registration**

1. Executive committees of rural, village, and city soviets of people's deputies where there are no military commissariats, and leaders of enterprises, institutions, and organizations and training-educational institutions, regardless of their jurisdiction and forms of ownership, must at the request of the military commissariats inform reservists and

inductees of their summons to military commissariats and provide for their prompt response to this summons.

2. Internal affairs organs and executive committees of rural, village, and city soviets of people's deputies where there are no military commissariats must:

- register and remove from the rosters reservists and inductees in their place of residence only if there are in their military training documents entries from military commissariats concerning military registration or removal from it;
- render military commissariats assistance in the placement of pre-inductees on military rosters and calling citizens up for military service (conferences), and in checking on the adherence to rules of military registration and the disclosure of inductees and reservists who violate these rules;
- search for, detain, and deliver to the military commissariats individuals who refuse to perform their universal military duty and also to perform alternative (nonmilitary) service.

3. Civil records organs must report within seven days to the rayon (city) military commissariats when reservists and inductees change their surnames, given names, and patronymics, when changes are made in the civilian records concerning the date and place of their birth, and also cases of registration of the death of a reservist or inductee.

4. Inquiry and preliminary investigation organs must within seven days report to rayon (city) military commissariats on inductees who are subjects of inquiries or preliminary investigations, and the courts—on inductees whose criminal cases are being tried by the courts, and also sentences against reservists and inductees that have been legally enforced.

The military identification cards of reservists and certificates of inductees who have been sentenced to incarceration, including a suspended sentence, are sent by the courts to the corresponding military commissariats.

5. Labor-training expert commissions must within seven days report to the corresponding rayon (city) military commissariats on all reservists and inductees who have been declared disabled, regardless of the disability group.

During times of induction, therapeutic institutions must within three days report to the corresponding rayon (city) military commissariats on all citizens of induction age undergoing inpatient treatment.

6. Leaders of housing operations organizations and other organizations, enterprises, and institutions that operate buildings and also home owners must promptly submit the necessary information on reservists and inductees to the corresponding military commissariats and executive committees of rural, village, and city soviets of people's deputies when there are no military commissariats which are responsible for registration of reservists and inductees and check on the reservists' and inductees' adherence to the rules of military registration, and also notify them when they are summoned to military commissariats.

7. In the event of changes in their family situations, health, addresses, education, places of employment, and positions, reservists and inductees must within seven days personally report this to the organ where their military registration is handled.

## CHAPTER VII.

### Induction in the case of mobilization. Demobilization

#### Article 39. Induction into the military service in the case of mobilization and subsequent inductions into the military service during wartime

General or partial mobilization on the territory of Ukraine is declared by the president of Ukraine for purposes of warding off an attack and for armed resistance to possible aggression. The president of Ukraine, in keeping with the procedure determined by legislation, declares a state of war throughout the entire territory of Ukraine or in individual places with a callup from the reserve of the necessary number of reservists for military service.

#### Article 40. Discharge because of demobilization

1. Discharge because of demobilization is conducted by an order of the president of Ukraine.

2. Military servicemen who have been discharged from military service in connection with demobilization are provided by the state with a complete set of uniforms and footwear. The state pays for the transportation of these military servicemen to their place of residence and provides for food en route.

#### Article 41. General military training of citizens

1. For purposes of preparing the necessary contingent for staffing the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other forces during wartime, by a decision of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, mandatory general military training is introduced for all men from 15 to 55 years of age and women from 18 to 45 years of age who do not have children or have children over eight years of age.

General military training of citizens is carried out in their place of employment, training, or residence without leave from production or training.

2. The organization and leadership of general military training are the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, organs of local state administration and local self-government, the ministries and departments of Ukraine, and other central organs of state government. Organs of local state administration and local self-government, enterprises, institutions, and organizations, regardless of their jurisdiction and forms of ownership, in conjunction with the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, create the necessary training-material base and provide for the selection and training of leaders of military training.

3. The procedure for conducting general military training and the category of individuals exempt from it are determined by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### Liability for violation of legislation on universal military obligation and military service

#### Article 42. Liability of officials and citizens

1. Leaders and other officials of state organs, enterprises, institutions, and organizations, and citizens guilty of violating the procedure for:

- military registration
- pre-induction training
- registration with draft board
- induction into compulsory military or alternative (nonmilitary) service
- induction of reserve officers into military service
- attendance of training camps (classes) in training organizations of the Society for Contributing to the Defense of Ukraine, defense-sports health camps, and military units or points on instructions from the military commissariat
- reporting when summoned to the military commissariat, and also their commission of other violations of legislation concerning the universal military obligation and military service are liable as established by law.

2. An inductee who refuses to be inducted and does not report on time to the military commissariat for departure for military service has his length of compulsory service extended by the amount of time during which he refused to be inducted.

For a military serviceman in compulsory service who abandons his place of service without authorization or does not report to his place of service at the time indicated in the order and does not have a valid reason for this the time of his absence from the military unit is not counted in his period of service.

## CHAPTER IX.

### Concluding provisions

#### Article 43. Financial and material support for measures related to fulfillment of universal military obligation

1. Financial and material support for measures related to fulfillment of universal military obligation and performance of military service are provided from funds of the state budget of Ukraine.

2. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea, and organs of local state administration and local self-government, in order to conduct medical examinations of citizens, induct them into military service, and send the inductees to their units, must provide the military commissariats with equipped induction (recruitment) points, medications, instruments, medical and office supplies, automotive transportation, and maintenance of public order.

For complete and high-quality fulfillment of plans for mobilization under wartime conditions, organs of local state administration and local self-government and, by their

decision, departments, enterprises, institutions, and organizations, and training institutions, agro-industrial enterprises, and cooperatives, regardless of their jurisdiction and form of ownership, during peacetime create with the military commissariats sections for notification and assembly of reservists and also collection of equipment from enterprises, institutions, and organizations, regardless of their jurisdiction and forms of ownership, supply them with personnel without relieving individuals from the performance of their basic duties in their workplace, and render assistance in their acquisition of occupational skills.

3. Members of commissions for assigning pre-inductees to draft boards, induction commissions, and medical commissions at military commissariats, physicians, and midlevel medical personnel, technical workers and service personnel assigned to work in the draft boards and assembly points during the placement of pre-inductees on the military rosters and the summoning of citizens to military service or conferences, for conducting medical examinations and repeat examinations of citizens, and also for sending inductees to their reporting points—they retain their jobs, positions, and average earnings during all the time they are performing these duties.

If these people's performance of their duties involves leaving their place of permanent residence the military commissariats reimburse them for their costs for travel from their place of residence to their place of work and back and for housing, and they pay per diem according to the norms set for business trips.

Article 44. The authority of the minister of internal affairs of Ukraine, the chairman of the Security Service of Ukraine, the commanders of the National Guard of Ukraine and the Border Troops of Ukraine, the chief of staff of Civil Defense of Ukraine, and the chiefs of the Administration for Protection of High Officials of Ukraine and other military formations in questions of fulfilling their universal military obligation and military service

The rights of the minister of defense of Ukraine specified by the present law are granted also to the minister of internal affairs of Ukraine, the chairman of the Security Service of Ukraine, the commanders of the National Guard of Ukraine and the Border Troops of Ukraine, the chiefs of the Administration for Protection of High Officials of Ukraine, and other military formations with respect to the troops, institutions, educational institutions, and military servicemen under their jurisdiction.

Normative acts for the performance of military duty and the procedure for going through military service published by the minister of internal affairs of Ukraine, the chairman of the Security Service of Ukraine, the commanders of the National Guard of Ukraine and the Border Troops of Ukraine, the chief of staff of Civil Defense of Ukraine, the chiefs of the Administration for Protection of High Officials of Ukraine and other military formations must meet the requirements of the present law.

[Signed] President of Ukraine L. Kravchuk.

**Navy Commander Pledges To Aid Those Released by Kasatonov**

*92UM1086A Moscow MEGAPOLIS EXPRESS  
in Russian No 19, 6 May 92 p 19*

[Interview with Ukrainian Navy Commander Rear Admiral Boris Borisovich Kozhin and Deputy Ukrainian Navy Commander Captain 1st Rank Anatoliy Danilov by MEGAPOLIS EXPRESS Correspondent Viktor Yadukha: "Boris Kozhin: I Am the President's Fist in the Black Sea (and His Muscles and His Support)"]

[Text] Ukraine still does not have a navy, but the Ukrainian Navy Commander has already been designated. He is Rear-Admiral Boris Kozhin, former commander of the Crimean Naval Base who was removed from his previous post by the Black Sea Fleet commander "for exceeding his authority." His deputy is Captain 1st Rank Anatoliy Danilov, a former fleet political worker and a Crimean Komsomol Obkom [Oblast Committee] and Ukrainian Komsomol Central Committee member. President Kravchuk has appointed Danilov his authorized representative at the Sevastopol military garrison. Our correspondent interviewed the officers.

[Yadukha] Boris Borisovich, at a meeting with journalists not long ago, you said that you are "the Ukrainian President's fist on the Black Sea." How should that be understood?

[Kozhin] I, as an admiral and commander, am subordinate to the president. And he defines my position here. But, I, in turn, am his muscle and support in the Black Sea Fleet. And although independent Ukraine adheres to a defensive doctrine, the president should not be ashamed of me in any situation which might arise on the Black or Mediterranean Seas where ships of the Ukrainian Navy will stand combat alert in the near future.

[Yadukha] They say that the Black Sea Fleet crisis may last a long time and you might remain a "commander without ships". Does that prospect disturb you?

[Kozhin] Naturally, the future of the Ukrainian Navy depends, first of all, on a political settlement of the issue. But, the creation of the Ukrainian Navy is already a reality. A little time will pass and we will have our ships, we will have everything... We are temporarily quartered here, at the warrant officers' school, and we have a small office and a telephone at our disposal for the time being.

[Yadukha] What is the average salary for an officer of the Ukrainian Navy?

[Kozhin] For now only I—the commander—of all the Ukrainian Naval Headquarters officers have been assigned to a post, although I am only now preparing to swear allegiance to Ukraine. Therefore, no one here is already receiving a salary, including me; people are working "for thanks".

[Yadukha] On the way to your headquarters, an officer patrol is verifying seamen's documents. Is that your guard detail?

[Danilov] No, they are probably Admiral Kasatonov's subordinates. I think the patrol was established near the gates in order to prevent our contacts with the men of the Black Sea Fleet... Incidentally, last month we were visited by nearly 140 sympathizers of all ranks and titles.

[Yadukha] What sort of people are these? Can it be said that you are accepting everyone who has been released by Admiral Kasatonov?

[Danilov] Yes, we would like to give refuge to the many who are dissatisfied with service in the Black Sea Fleet, who have been released, or who simply want to serve Ukraine. But at the moment we have neither the staff, the money, nor the allowances to do that. However sooner or later, the Ukrainian Navy will be created and then we will find suitable jobs for all of these people.

[Yadukha] Boris Borisovich, you, like the majority of the highest military commanders of Ukraine's Armed Forces, are Russian. Were you enticed by the high post of commander or did patriotic feelings outweigh on the scales?

[Kozhin] I have always considered myself to be a Ukrainian citizen and I am quite solidly tied to Ukraine. I have lived in Lutsk in Volyna Oblast since I was 16 years old. From there I was sent to Leningrad Higher Naval Command School imeni Frunze, after which I once again returned to serve in Ukraine. I spend all my leaves in my native parts.

[Yadukha] Are you a kindred spirit of Western Ukraine?

[Kozhin] I am close to her people, whom I have known since my youth. Over the course of many years, I have met with representatives of the most varied social strata, from simple workers to Western Ukrainian political figures. They are a glorious and good people... Although I must admit that I have not yet mastered the Ukrainian language.

**Officers 'Deserted' by Russia, 'Deceived' by Ukraine**

*92UM1086B Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA  
in Russian 26 May 92 p 3*

[Article by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA Military Commentator Nikolay Panyukov: "Russia Has Deserted Us, and Ukraine Has Deceived Us..." That Is What Some Russian Officers Think Who Have Taken the Oath to the New State"]

[Text] Never before has life driven Aleksandr Vasilyevich "into a corner" as it has occurred right now. He has never felt so helpless and devastated.

"I am already a fully mature man based upon my age," he wrote in his letter to the editorial office. "I am 37 years old. In my opinion, I occupy a high post. But now I am as confused and bewildered as a little boy by what is going on. An officer recertification process is occurring in the army which has nothing in common with determining an officer's professional capabilities. There is more concern about something else: about 'ethnic standards.'

"If you are Russian, then they will definitely ask: What is keeping you in Ukraine?

"In general, it is not a recertification, but an utter humiliation..."

And later, while discussing a similar case in a 10-page letter, Colonel Aleksandr Ivashchenko, a composite aviation regimental commander from the Carpathian Military District, arrived at the conclusion that Russia simply abandoned

both he, a native of Kamchatka, and thousands of other Russian officers at a difficult moment and Ukraine, as it now turns out, deceived them.

Of course that is an oversimplified opinion. But is it that far from the truth?

Let us recall: was there this great alarm, as there obviously should have been throughout all of Russia, when it became clear that 70,000 of her sons were practically given an ultimatum: either swear allegiance to Ukraine or follow your nose on out of here. Alas. Little of a specific nature was undertaken except for the general words of the leaders of various levels that, they said, in that case we will find housing and work for everyone in our country.

Let us recall something else: Ukraine promised the officers who had sworn allegiance to it, if not "mountains of gold," then at least an entire collection of guarantees of social and legal protection. But, incidentally, the main thing is that the majority of them "took the bait": there was no doubt that the officers, who had taken the oath of allegiance, would continue to serve at the same location and in the same post.

"And now, it turns out that we, the command staff, have still not joined the Ukrainian Armed Forces," said Aleksandr Vasilyevich. "We still need to undergo recertification. But isn't this really a deception? And the main thing: the command authorities solemnly assured us that they would build a state and not a national army. They assured us that no purges, recertifications or transfers whatsoever would follow... But, as they say, the echoes of these promises have not had time to fade away and we are already witnesses not just to national, but to deeply nationalist motives in the creation of the new army. And SOU [Union of Ukrainian Officers] was the first to begin singing this song and it places itself higher than the entire command authority and in its zeal has long since given a damn about all of the GlavPUR [Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy] structures taken together and is conducting a cadre policy that suits itself and, more precisely, a real purge. Our air army commander recently frankly stated that SOU must ensure the creation of a national officer corps. That is why I, the commander, cannot resolve a single cadre issue without coordination with SOU. In general, as before, without the Party committee or political department... Only more abruptly... And I think that the hour is near when SOU will be transformed into the punishing sword of the Ukrainian Armed Forces..."

I do not dare judge about the "punishing sword" but I have had the opportunity to hear quite a bit on the "shake ups" that this union is systematically conducting, by way of illustration, in the Carpathian Military District. And everyone is catching hell from these "zealous lads," as they are called in the troops: both the minor commanders and those that are located near the very penthouse.

In the decree of one of its conferences, Lvov SOU, for example, demanded that three generals—Carpathian Military District Personnel Directorate Chief V. Durishev, Carpathian Military District Aviation Chief V. Ivannikov, and Directorate Chief V. Volgushev, who allegedly "conducted

persecutions against nationally-minded officers and who despise the national and spiritual renewal"—be immediately relieved of their duties.

And quite recently members of this union have already threatened Military District Commander Lieutenant-General V. Stepanov: if he does not change the cadre policy he is conducting, the question of his presence in the post will be raised before the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense leadership.

So, Colonel Ivashchenko is far from the first on the list of those who have found themselves under the "intent gaze" of the SOU's all-seeing eye. And he is certainly not the last. Since the majority of the officers in SOU are certain that they are bringing the maximum benefit to their army and to their Homeland through this "bloody" work. It is difficult to reproach them for sympathies with a national tint. All the more so since not they, but higher and more respected officials, are setting the tone in this matter.

By way of illustration, tirades are being heard from the mouths of Kiev's parliamentary figures that are imbued with anti-Russian sentiments and by the aspiration to transform the nearly 350-year period of the joint presence of Russians and Ukrainians in one state into an indictment against Russia which allegedly colonized Ukraine.

"Just who could have assumed that everything would have turned out like this?" now laments Colonel Ivashchenko. "Who would have thought that the decision of the Pereyaslav Rada—"so that everyone is united forever"—would become an empty phrase for someone in Ukraine? Over 13 million mixed Russian-Ukrainian families live in Russia and in Ukraine alone. Yes and I myself am a bit Ukrainian: My great-grandfather on my father's side was from Ukraine. But I am also a bit Georgian—my grandmother on my mother's side was from Georgia... Not only I but also my ancestors could not have expected this turn of events."

Not for the sake of reproaching Aleksandr Vasilyevich for something but rather for in all fairness, I will say that there nevertheless were those who suggested something similar. And therefore they immediately decided: I will not take an oath under any guise.

"It wasn't even a question for me," Lieutenant Colonel Aleksey Yeremin, who has been waiting for those days when he will be assigned to Russia to continue serving, told me during a meeting at Zheleznaya (now Zaliznaya) Division. "How could I, a Russian man, swear allegiance to another state? If they had simply proposed service on contract to me—that would have been another matter. But an oath—that is a sacred concept. Those who did not understand this are already sorry..."

One of those, Platoon Commander Senior Lieutenant Aleksandr Shevkunov, came to Yeremin, his (although already at that time he had already lost that post) battalion commander with the confession: "I made a mistake. Sign a request for a release into the reserve."

But not only officers have made that mistake. It turns out that those who made at one time a real grandiose show of the hasty oath-taking also made a mistake. Air Army Commander Major-General Antonets also said at a personnel

assembly of the unit commanded by Colonel Ivashchenko: "The decision to provide the opportunity to take the oath to all those willing to do so was a big mistake."

No, this will already be a bit more than a mistake. Because behind it are the crippled futures, broken biographies, and lost dreams of hundreds and hundreds. Right now the thought is being openly propagated in the speeches of not only SOU representatives but also of big Kiev politicians that it is permissible for no more than 25 percent of command cadres to be of non-native origin. But who, tell me for mercy's sake, forced those same politicians to seek the urgent "privatization" of the three military districts, 80 percent of the officer corps of which is Russian [rossiyane].

And one of them is Colonel Ivashchenko. He does not want to go before the recertification commission. He does not want to because he does not want to be asked, like Simferopol General Kuznetsov and like other Russian officers, "Will you fight Russia?"

"...It will not work out," Aleksandr Vasilyevich wrote in his letter to the editorial office. "Nothing will separate me from my brother-Russians. I will never fight against them. And I am not alone... And I do not want to and I cannot live any longer in a state which is making it so that it is separate and nationalistic. And I simply reject that deception with the oath. Homeland, forgive me that sin and take me back..."

Well, the "sin" certainly can be forgiven. And we need to. The people did not seek that "adventure" for themselves. Our unpredictable times presented it to them. And let us not have spite or insults against them for that. But how can we help them? And with what can we help them?

Aleksandr Vasilyevich and many of those who have found themselves in that same situation as he, awaited with hope the results of the Commonwealth heads of state meeting in Tashkent. They hoped that the signing of the Treaty on Collective Security would somehow alleviate the situation in the foreign land. After all, the armies of the CIS states would have a common mission and a common strategy and, therefore, even greater cooperation. But it was Ukraine that did not place its signature on that document.

So what now? Hope for the next meeting? Run, like the pilots from Starokonstantinov already have? Or await the arrival of a new Bogdan Khmelnitskiy who will exclaim: come to your senses, lads, we are a united people and we must live together like our ancestors who "were united forever."

But it would be simplest of all, if the two presidents of the two neighboring states could manage to understand the entire tragedy of the situation of these people. And having understood and felt, they could conclude a social interstate agreement according to which officers, if they desired, could leave one state, without impediments and without restrictions, in order to continue serving in the other. As Colonel Ivashchenko wants to. And then these people will stop thinking that one state abandoned them and the other deceived them.

P.S. I don't want our readers to get the impression that all Russian officers who have taken the oath of allegiance have had all they can stand, like Ivashchenko, Shevkunov, and many others. That is not so. At least for now. In that same

Carpathian Military District, I had the opportunity to meet quite a few officers who are even very satisfied with their situation, especially by the fact that now there will be no reason for them to be sent to serve in the Far East or in the Transcaucasus...

## BYELARUS

### Law Defines Veteran Status, Benefits

#### Text of Law

*925D0447A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 14 May 92 p 2*

[Law of the Republic of Byelarus on Veterans, signed by Republic of Byelarus Supreme Soviet Chairman S. Shushkevich, 17 April 1992, Minsk: "Law of the Republic of Byelarus On Veterans"]

[Text] This law defines the legal status of veterans of war, labor and the Armed Forces (hereinafter referred to as veterans), establishes the circle of individuals who make use of the benefits, and also guarantees of the activities of veterans' organizations.

#### Article 1. State Policy With Regard to Veterans

State policy with regard to veterans is structured based on the following principles:

- ensuring social and legal protection;
- guaranteed security at a level no lower than the minimum wage;
- creation of conditions for the maintenance of physical and psychological health, and active longevity in accordance with the achievements of modern science;
- provision of housing;
- granting each veteran social services, the types and quality of which will ensure satisfaction of vital needs;
- promotion of the activities of veterans' organizations and the direct involvement of veterans in the formation and realization of policies and programs that affect all of society and veterans in particular; and,
- creation of needed conditions for participation in socially useful activities and the realization of the right to work without any restrictions whatsoever, with the exception of state of health.

#### Article 2. Veterans of War

Citizens, who participated in combat operations for the defense of the Homeland in armies (navies) in the field, partisan detachments and the underground and who also participated in local wars and military conflicts on the territory of other countries as part of formations and as specialists and advisors of the Armed Forces, USSR Committee for State Security, and USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs are recognized as veterans of war.

The following are also recognized as veterans:

- citizens who participated in armed conflict with bandit formations as part of hunter battalions, platoons, and detachments for the protection of the people that operated from 1 January 1944 until 31 December 1951 on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR, Belorussian SSR, and the Baltic republics;

- citizens who participated in the armed struggle against the Fascist invaders as part of hunter detachments or a popular untrained volunteer military force during the Great Patriotic War;
- citizens who participated in special formations in mine-clearing operations of territory after its liberation from German occupation in 1943-1945;
- workers of special formations who were transferred during the period of the Great Patriotic War to the status of individuals who were in the ranks of the Red Army and who carried out tasks in the interests of the army and navy in rear service areas of active fronts or operational zones of fleets in the field; and,
- citizens who permanently reside on the territory of the Republic of Byelorussia who participated in combat operations against Fascist Germany, its allies and imperialist Japan during the Second World War on the territory of foreign countries as part of national armies.

Henceforth, the procedures for determining the status of a veteran of war will be established by the Republic of Byelorussia Supreme Soviet.

#### **Article 3. Veterans of Labor**

Citizens, who have, in accordance with the law that is in force, the right to an old-age pension, including the disabled, and who have length of service required for designation of an old-age pension, are recognized as veterans of labor.

#### **Article 4. Veterans of the Armed Forces**

Servicemen, who have been released into the reserve or who have retired due to age or length of service in accordance with the law that is in force on pension provision of servicemen, are recognized veterans of the Armed Forces.

#### **Article 5. Pension Provision**

Pensions are designated for veterans in accordance with the law that is in force on pension provision of civilians and servicemen.

#### **Article 6. The Bases for the Political, Social and Legal Status of Veterans**

Veterans in the Republic of Byelorussia have political, socio-economic, and individual rights and freedoms in their entirety and have the obligations provided for citizens by the Constitution of the Republic of Byelorussia and by other legal acts.

While recognizing the contributions of veterans, the state guarantees them additional rights and benefits based on this Law and other legislative acts.

#### **Article 7. The Bases for the Legal Status and the Creation of Veterans Organizations**

Veterans organizations, headed by veterans councils elected by them and united by the Republic Council and that carry out their activities in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Byelorussia on social associations and the charter of the Republic of Byelorussia Veterans' Organization, are created to protect veterans' rights and interests that are guaranteed by law in oblasts, rayons, cities, at enterprises, organizations, institutions and at their place of residence.

Veterans organizations at the appropriate level have the right to participate in the development and adoption of the decisions of state bodies, to represent and defend veterans' interests in state and social bodies, to exercise other powers provided for by the law on social associations and by other laws, and to also obtain the required information on the issues of socio-economic situation of working and non-working veterans from the administrations of enterprises, organizations, institutions, and organs of state and economic management.

#### **Article 8. Continuation of Work Activity**

Veterans who are receiving a pension have the right to continue work activity at the enterprise, organization, or institution where they previously worked or at another enterprise, regardless of the form of ownership, and also to be involved with entrepreneurial activities that are not prohibited by law, and to create enterprises of any form of management.

The restriction of labor, entrepreneurial, or other socially useful activity of veterans is not permitted, with the exception of cases prescribed by law.

Additional benefits for the improvement of living conditions, rendering medical assistance, and sanatorium-resort and cultural services that have been established at that enterprise, organization or institution, as compared to law that is in force, can be granted to a veteran after departure on a pension based on a decision of the labor collective.

#### **Article 9. Guarantees of Productive Activities of Veterans' Organizations**

State bodies, within the confines of their competence, can render financial support to veterans' organizations, grant subsidies from resources of appropriate budgets, and provide buildings, office space, equipment and other property needed to carry out their charter obligations at no charge.

Enterprises of veterans of war, labor, and the Armed Forces, at which no less than 70 percent of the average strength of industrial-production personnel working there are pensioners, are released from payment of taxes on profits.

#### **Article 10. Improvement of Housing Conditions**

Veterans who need improved housing conditions are provided housing by local Soviets of People's Deputies' ispolkoms [executive committees] at the residence location or by enterprises at the former work location in accordance with Republic of Byelorussia housing law.

Veterans have a priority right to entry into housing construction (housing), garage cooperatives, and horticultural partnerships, and also to receive preferential loans for individual housing construction.

#### **Article 11. Payment of Rent and Utilities**

Veterans of war (men who have reached 60 years of age, women who have reached 55 years of age), rehabilitated victims of political repression, and non-working veterans of labor and the Armed Forces (men who have reached 60 years of age, women who have reached 55 years of age), who do not have children and also those who live apart from

their children and other relatives, are granted a 50 percent discount on the payment of rent within the standards provided by law that is in force, payment for the use of telephone (other than inter-city and international conversations), utilities (heat, gas, water, and electricity) and who live in homes that do not have central heating—a 50 percent discount from the cost of fuel acquired within the standards established for sale to the population.

Provision of fuel to veterans is conducted in a priority manner.

The difference in payment of rent, utilities, telephone, and fuel is conducted using the state budget.

#### **Article 12. Retail-Consumer Services**

The local authorities create special stores, sections, and departments to organize veterans' retail-consumer services with manufactured necessities and send to them a definite part of the goods through specific designation and organize services at the home of veterans with restricted mobility.

The boards of kolkhozes and the administrations of sovkhozes take steps to render assistance to incapacitated veterans who live alone in acquiring needed foodstuffs, cultivating garden plots, in providing fodder for the maintenance of domesticated cattle and poultry, and also in the repair of housing, farm structures, and in the delivery of fuel.

Veterans who have reached: men—60 years of age, women—55 years of age, have a priority right to installation of apartment telephones and service at consumer and public catering enterprises.

Local Soviets of People's Deputies' are responsible for the organization of retail- consumer services for veterans.

#### **Article 13. Medical Services**

Veterans, when they depart on pension, retain the right to obtain medical assistance at public health institutions to which they were attached during the period of work (service) and also for sanatorium-resort treatment.

The procedures for granting sanatorium-resort treatment are determined by public health and social security organs and by social organizations.

Veterans have the right, based on the conclusion of medical institutions, to rehabilitative treatment at special rehabilitation centers using state budget resources.

#### **Article 14. Supplying Drugs and Medicines**

Veterans, who have reached 70 years of age, are supplied with drugs and medicines, based upon a doctor's prescription, with a 50 percent discount of their cost.

The difference in payment is conducted using state budget resources.

#### **Article 15. Geriatric Assistance**

Local Soviets of People's Deputies organize and finance the development of a system of geriatric assistance through a network of geriatric offices, boarding houses, and hospitals for the chronically ill who need continuous care.

#### **Article 16. Prosthetics**

Prosthetics of extremities, the oral cavity, (other than prostheses made from precious metals), and organs of hearing and sight of veterans are conducted by public health and social security institutions primarily in accordance with established procedures.

Expenditures for these types of prosthetics are conducted using state budget resources.

#### **Article 17. Travel on Public Passenger Transportation**

Veterans, who have reached: men—60 years of age, women—55 years of age, have the right to travel, at no charge, using all types of city passenger transportation (with the exception of taxis) and also common carriers (with the exception of taxis) in rural locations within the administrative rayon of their place of residence.

Expenditures are conducted using state budget resources.

#### **Article 18. Veterans' Rights to Acquire Property With De-Statization and Privatization of State Property and Housing**

Veterans have the right to participate in de-statization and privatization of state enterprises, organizations, institutions, property and housing in accordance with the law that is in force.

#### **Article 19. Material Assistance**

Local Soviets of People's Deputies and labor collectives have the right to conduct supplementary payments to veterans' pensions using their own resources and to periodically change these additional payments in accordance with the standard of living conditions in that region, and can render assistance for medical treatment, acquisition of technical devices that ease the lives and activities of veterans, for repair of housing and other needs, for which appropriate funds are created.

#### **Article 20. Territorial Social Services Centers, Social Assistance Departments at Home, Boarding Houses, and Dormitories**

Local Soviets of People's Deputies, social security organs, enterprises, organizations, institutions, and kolkhozes, for the purpose of creating suitable living and everyday life conditions for veterans, organize territorial social services centers, social assistance departments at home and boarding houses, and also special residences with service complexes for social-everyday life services and labor activities of veterans.

Dormitories are organized for individuals who need permanent outside assistance.

#### **Article 21. On the Extension of Benefits**

The benefits, provided for by legislation that is in force for Great Patriotic War Group III disabled persons, are extended to veterans of war who have reached 70 years of age.

The benefits provided for by legislation that is in force for participants of war are extended to:

citizens of the Republic of Belarus who participated in Resistance Movements on the territory of other states and also to foreign citizens and individuals without citizenship

who participated in combat operations as part of the Soviet Armed Forces, corresponding military subunits, partisan detachments and division-sized units, and underground organizations;

citizens of the Republic of Byelarus—former juvenile prisoners of Fascist concentration camps, ghettos, and other forced internment locations created by Fascist Germany and its allies during the Second World War; and,

persons who have been disabled since childhood due to wounds, contusions, and serious injuries associated with combat operations during the Great Patriotic War or with its consequences.

#### **Article 22. Social Guarantees for Families of Deceased Servicemen**

Benefits are granted to families of deceased servicemen, partisans, and members of the underground in accordance with the law that is in force.

#### **Article 23. The Planning and Financing of Measures for the Social Protection of Veterans**

The Republic of Byelarus Supreme Soviet, the Republic of Byelarus government, and local Soviets of People's Deputies carry out planning of measures for the social protection of servicemen. Financing of veterans' social protection programs is carried through the republic and local budgets and the Republic of Byelarus Pension and Social Security Funds.

#### **Article 24. Ritual Servicing**

The ritual servicing of deceased veterans is conducted in accordance with the law that is in force and with other normative acts. Labor collectives, where a veteran previously worked, and voyenkomats [military commissariats] render assistance to relatives in the organization of the funeral of the deceased veteran. The burial of deceased veterans without families is conducted using local housing-utility management services budget resources.

#### **Article 25. Republic of Byelarus Legislation on Veterans**

Republic of Byelarus Legislation on Veterans consists of this Law, previously adopted legislative acts of the former USSR and the Republic of Byelarus that establish veterans' rights and benefits in social-everyday life and transportation services, rendering medical assistance and other spheres of life, and subsequent acts of republic legislation that are adopted in development of this Law.

#### **Article 26. Cessation of the Right to Benefits**

The force of the benefits provided for by this Law cease when a court sentences veterans to criminal punishment for the period when the veterans are imprisoned.

[Signed] S. Shushkevich

Republic of Byelarus Supreme Soviet Chairman  
17 April 1992, Minsk

#### **Decree of Implementation**

*925D0447B Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA  
in Russian 14 May 92 p 2*

[Republic of Byelarus Supreme Soviet Decree, signed by Republic of Byelarus Supreme Soviet Chairman S. Shushkevich, 17 April 1992, Minsk: "Republic of Byelarus Supreme Soviet Decree on the Introduction Into Force of the Republic of Byelarus Law 'On Veterans'"]

[Text] The Republic of Byelarus Supreme Soviet **decrees**:

1. To put into effect the Law of the Republic of Byelarus "On Veterans" from January 1, 1993; Article 21—from July 1, 1993.

2. The Byelarus Republic Council of Ministers in the period prior to January 1, 1993:

—will determine the procedures for granting benefits to individuals indicated in the second part of Article 2, Articles 11, 14, 17, and 21 of this Law; and,  
—will make a Republic of Byelarus government decision in accordance with the Law of the Republic of Byelarus "On Veterans".

3. Recommend that local Soviets of People's Deputies develop and implement steps directed at the realization of the provisions of the Law and also seek the possibility for establishing additional benefits for veterans.

[Signed] S. Shushkevich  
Republic of Byelarus Supreme Soviet Chairman  
17 April 1992, Minsk

#### **BALTIC STATES**

##### **Fleets of Former Baltic Republics Described**

*92UN1463A Moscow ROSSIYA in Russian  
No 18, 29 Apr 92 p 5*

[Article by Aleksandr Cherepanov: "Recollections of the Naval Future"]

[Text] Recently a report flashed in the newspapers on the intentions of the Latvian Republic to begin a reoutfitting of fishing inspection ships to convert them into naval vessels for carrying out border patrol functions in national territorial waters. The naval detachment is expected to include up to 20 light patrol boats. For Latvia, which has proclaimed adherence to a defensive, nonaggressive doctrine, creation of its own naval contingent, which will become a part of its national armed forces, is a necessary step on the path towards restoration of full sovereignty.

In contrast to Ukraine, however, Latvia, like the other two Baltic republics, does not at present make any open claims on the warships of the former USSR which are stationed in its ports. Yet three main questions stand out first and foremost in all three capitals, which require a definitive resolution as preparations are made for talks in Moscow. They are: the withdrawal of troops, now brought under Russian jurisdiction, from their territories; elimination of the ecological aftereffects of their presence, including reimbursement for financial expenditures; and compensation for

losses within their armed forces, including the navy, which were incurred in 1940 as a result of their "voluntary" entry into the Red Army.

What can the equivalent be which must apparently be returned to the Baltics, if talks on this score lead to mutual agreement? In this regard, we should recall how the naval forces of the three Baltic states looked more than 50 years ago.

In 1936 the most modern combat fleet, of all three of these republics, was considered to be the Latvian fleet. Its pride consisted of two submarines—Ronis and Spidola—built in France in 1926. Both had a displacement of 395 tonnes, length of 55 meters, and width of almost 5 meters. Their armament consisted of six torpedo systems, one 75-mm cannon, and two machine guns.

The Latvian red-white-red flag also waved above two trawlers—Imanta and Vistrus. Armed with 75-mm cannons and four machine guns, they carried on board up to 30 mines. These forces were supplemented by the minelayer Virsaytis, built in Rostok in 1917, whose "arsenal" included up to 150 mines, in addition to the other armament.

The Latvian fleet also had a small number of auxiliary support ships, including the artillery cutter Artillerists (45 tonnes, built in 1910), the submarine tender Varonis (400 tonnes, 1908), and the hydrographic ship Khidrografs (600 tonnes, 1918).

Estonia had the largest naval forces, tonnage-wise and in numbers of ships. Its flagship was the former German torpedo boat Sulev (228 tonnes, 76-mm cannons, and two torpedo systems), built on the shipbuilding docks of Shikhai in Elblong. In addition, Estonian naval forces included one submarine-chaser, two formerly German trawlers—Kalev and Olev, one French trawler—Tankona, and two minelayers—Surop and Ristna. The white-blue-black of Estonia also flew above four gunboats—Laene (400 tonnes, 1915), Akhti (144 tonnes, 1908), Tartu (80 tonnes), and Madrus (80 tonnes).

Patrol forces included two small ships and six cutters.

The tiny naval force contingent of Lithuania was identified by just one ship of any significance—the Atanas Smetona (500 tonnes), a former German destroyer built in 1917. Thus, the naval force composition of the Baltic states of that time is more a manifestation of symbolic combat power, although with a powerful political "charge." Today large fleets are an expensive pleasure—even many of the larger and more wealthy countries find they cannot afford them. But we must assume that the leaders of the Baltic states do not aspire to amass such fleets.

#### **Problems with Latvian Spring Call-Up**

92UN1428A Riga SM SEGODNYA in Russian  
12 May 92 p 1

[Latvian Defense Ministry Official Aleksandr Doniks interviewed by Aleksey Pereverzev: "Is Spring Call-Up Proceeding According to Plan?"]

[Text] According to plan, the spring call-up should provide the Latvian army with 1,500 new recruits. If we consider the fact that before, the Soviet Army gathered 600 to 700 people from Riga alone—that's not very much. But commanders at the local level might never get the planned number of new recruits.

According to the Latvian Republic law "On Compulsory State Service," all youths who are between the ages 19 and 25, permanently reside on the territory of Latvia, and are not entitled to exemption are subject to call-up for military service.

A provision on exemptions that is somewhat expanded in comparison with the old Soviet one allows one to conclude that the Latvian army will be healthier than in the former Union. In addition, the sole breadwinner in a family is not subject to call-up, as in the past, and the same applies to fathers with two or more children, people enrolled in educational institutions, and the children of handicapped parents. This same group also includes people who served in the Soviet Army, regardless of length of service.

The call-up commission decides where a young man will serve—along Latvia's borders or in Ministry of Internal Affairs units—depending on the assessment of his health by a medical commission (categories A, B, C, D, and E) and his knowledge of the Latvian language. For example, only those whose state of health falls under category A and who know Latvian are assigned to the borders. A recruit with a category E state of health is fit only for labor service, which lasts no more than 18 months, while military service lasts for two years. But now call-up for labor service has for all practical purposes been curtailed because enterprises and local bodies of self-government have not expressed a need for this, and therefore category E recruits are being exempted.

I asked Aleksandr Doniks, chief of the Latvian Republic Ministry of Defense state service and mobilization directorate, to comment on some of the problems associated with the call-up and service.

[Doniks] I want to reassure those who fear the spread in our army of such phenomena as hazing, the formation of groups based on place of origin, and so on. None of this exists, nor can it. We strictly monitor discipline, and the fellows serve not far away from their homes, often with their friends. They live in good barracks, and sometimes with their parents at home. The servicemen get a cash allowance of one-fifth of the minimum wage, and those doing labor service get the full minimum wage. We hope that by fall, construction workers will finish a number of new facilities along the borders, and that there will be no difficulties with quartering. For the time being, such problems do exist on account of the Russian Army's failure to meet its commitments to vacate barracks at military compounds.

[Correspondent] The provision of the law mandating that "all permanent residents of Latvia" must perform service is causing considerable controversy.

[Doniks] Yes, until there is a law on citizenship, all youths of draft age who permanently reside in Latvia must perform service. Why shouldn't a person who lives on Latvian

territory and enjoys its benefits be subject to its laws? If he is a national of Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania, and so on, he can also serve in his own country, but he will have to reenter without any special preferences, as determined by the migration commission. This procedure exists in most countries. After all, not one American who is not a US citizen leaves it for more than one year—otherwise he has to reenter as a foreigner. We are now drafting amendments to the existing law and a new law on state service in which these matters will be spelled out in greater detail. But in the meantime, the call-up is being conducted under the old law, and it has to be enforced. If not, agencies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Procuracy will become involved.

[Correspondent] How frequent are instances of evasion of call-up and what are their causes?

[Doniks] Such instances have occurred, but they have been few. Most of them stem from the impossibility of arriving promptly at the local state service department (on account of transportation difficulties in rural areas) or from the delayed receipt of notices forwarded by mail. On the whole, the spring call-up, like the fall one, is proceeding according to plan.

[Correspondent] At the local level and at call-up centers in Riga there is less optimism and confidence. Most conscripts, regardless of nationality and language, have to be sought out, persuaded, and forced. On receiving their first notice, most of the youths who report to the state service center are those who are confident they will get an exemption. Data from the medical commissions illustrate this clearly: In the fall, between 30 percent and 50 percent of all those who had been called up were declared unfit for service. The situation has not changed this spring.

In Ziemelskiy Rayon last fall, fewer than 10 percent of all those who had been called up reported after receiving their notices. This spring, of those who sought to evade call-up—and they numbered more than 200—less than half of the total showed up after receiving new notices. The Latgalskiy suburb state service department was visited last fall by about 50 percent of all youths who had been summoned. Improvements in this situation this spring have been negligible. Tsentralnyy Rayon, which has a minimal Russian-speaking population, actually overfulfilled the fall plan, allowing other rayons to call up fewer youths; but today that rayon is itself in need of help, for only a handful are reporting voluntarily. The municipal police, zemessary [voluntary militarized formation], and procuracy agencies have to be called in to search for and persuade the majority.

Viktor Blusins, head of the state service department of Riga's Tsentralnyy Rayon, said: "Last fall, there was also a certain emotional enthusiasm, a desire to serve. But now we don't have this. Virtually all the youths with whom we have to have a talk try to find some sort of loophole in order not to serve in the army. I've worked with conscription for several years, but I've never seen this kind of situation. There is an enormous number of sick young people. While a few years ago conscripts were happy on setting off to serve in Kaliningrad, since it was close to home, today Liepaja is far away. And it is so much harder for those who serve on the call-up commissions after having left production work and

teaching. Seasoned personnel, with their experience and ties, have been dismissed because of insufficient knowledge of Latvian, and new ones are only just beginning to gain an understanding of the subtleties of our work. Generally speaking, in my opinion, we're still a very long way off from efficiently organized call-up work."

The heads of the state service departments in three Riga rayons that I visited spoke of flaws in the laws, which create additional difficulties. Most of those who try to evade service try to take advantage of the fact that the citizenship question remains unresolved. Some think that they are citizens of Latvia and should work for its benefit, instead of wasting time on useless drills, while others do not intend to become Latvian citizens and therefore see no reason to take an oath to a foreign state.

Under Latvian Republic laws, those who refuse to serve are subject to administrative sanctions: a fine of 50 rubles or three days' detention. If this measure is not enough to influence them, they are subject to criminal liability, which, depending on a court's decision, entails a fine of 500 rubles or up to two years behind bars. Last fall, not a single legal proceeding of this kind was instituted. Now times have changed, and rayon procuracy offices already have dozens of such cases.

Where Latvian citizens are concerned, the situation is clear: They have to obey the law. But what about citizens of other states? After obtaining the citizenship of another country, a young man is automatically crossed off the lists of those subject to call-up. And if he is already serving? Officials of the Ministry of Defense assured me that such persons will be discharged from the army as soon as possible. If this happens, who will be left to serve? And in that event, how will the gaps that arise in Latvia's defense capability be filled? Who will left to receive notices next fall if state service directorates are already having difficulties in calling up even potential foreigners?

There are many questions. Their answers, obviously, will not be long in coming. But the spring call-up will continue to proceed in the chaos that currently reigns, despite the fact that the Latvian Republic Ministry of Defense is confident that all is going to plan.

## CAUCASIAN STATES

### Progress in Creating Azerbaijani Armed Forces Assessed

92UM1099A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
4 Jun 92 First edition p 2.

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Captain 3rd Rank V. Maryukha, under the rubric: "National Armies: The View From Within": "The Azerbaijani Armed Forces Are Being Created Under the Protection of Eight-Pointed Stars"]

[Text] A soldier of any nationality firmly knows the new recruit's humorous commandment: in order for service to go more smoothly, you need to rarely be seen by the commander and be closer to the kitchen. In the Azerbaijani Republic Ministry of Defense, the corridors of which I have walked

through backward and forward, they have frequently complained to me that, they say, the republic's envoys to the collapsed union army have understood too straightforwardly this unpretentious soldier's science. Having expressed their intention to create their own army in the fall of 1991, even today Azerbaijan has still not assembled under its banner specialists who are capable of handling modern military vehicles. It is therefore obvious that the rear services directorate has become nearly the very first directorate of the ministry that has reached full capacity. And that is understandable: It will shod, clothe, and feed soldiers—and there will be weapons not to be a burden for it and the orders of commanders will be carried out without complaints about the difficulties of service. Although there are quite a few problems with weapons as well as with commanders.

"We still don't have a developed conscription system into the army," Azerbaijani Minister of Defense Military Advisor Colonel Nuraddin Sadykov told me. "Each time we draft exactly as many conscripts as the five or six officers of the subunit being created can train. And these subunits are being created only to the extent of their manning with command staff and weapons."

Naturally, this is not having the best impact on the implementation of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces organizational development concept that has been developed. To protect the republic's sovereignty and territorial integrity (that is how they have worded the tasks of the Armed Forces that are being created), they propose having a small navy (the decision has not yet been made whether it will be a flotilla, a Navy, or if the designation will be something else), the basis of which will be the Caspian Flotilla ships and units that are being transferred in accordance with the agreement achieved. A fighter aircraft regiment, a helicopter regiment and an air transport regiment will compose the foundation of the Air Force. The border troops will be subordinate to the Republic Ministry of Security. But all of that is in the future. Right now just the ground forces, the foundation of which will be mechanized brigades, are being formed. They told me that up to half of them will be concentrated on the western axis—near the current zone of interethnic conflict.

In fact, they told me at the Republic Ministry of Defense that the army is being created only because there is no peace on the ancient land of the Transcaucasus. In view of the multitude of problems in the economy with the creation of the Armed Forces, one could hold off, stressed my interlocutors and they cited this argument in confirmation of their words: the republic is not rushing to nationalize the Caspian Flotilla forces that already belongs to it in accordance with the agreement. No one is threatening Azerbaijan from the sea therefore, they can also not rush with the receipt and transfer. But there is a dire need for tanks, cannon, BTRs [armored transport vehicles], and ammunition for the undeclared war in Nagorno-Karabakh. And, as of today, the 4th Army is actually the only "source" from which Azerbaijan intends to cull the foundation of its military might in the near future.

In general, the army has already begun to transfer equipment and is ready to do this in the future in precise compliance with the schedule. But there are too few specialists who have been trained to sit behind the throttle of a tank

or armored vehicle in the republic. There is also a shortage of representatives of many other military professions, including communications specialists. And I saw with my own eyes what an army without communications is like. It required nearly a day for the Republic Ministry of Defense and its Main Staff to determine: Had Lachin been surrendered to Armenian armed formations or, on the contrary, had they won it back. When the situation had cleared somewhat, it turned out that the troops had retreated, allegedly having received the appropriate order through the operational command and control networks.

"There is nothing surprising in that," Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense Communications Directorate Chief Lieutenant Colonel V. Boslovayak told me. "It happens that orders and reports on their execution are being transmitted with... an accompanying motor vehicle. What better secrecy or efficiency here..."

The lack of the republic's own cadres is compelling them to fill vacant posts with representatives of other nationalities—with officers and warrant officers from troop units and subunits that are deployed in Azerbaijan. No one in the units has restrained those desiring to serve the sovereign state. And there are no obstacles for them from the Azeri side. As Republic Ministry of Defense Deputy Press Center Chief Azad Isa-zade noted, the republic is creating not so much a national army as an army of Azerbaijani citizens. Everyone who desires to may serve in it: for money, for the national idea, or according to the draft based on the Union Law on Universal Military Obligation that is still in effect. Russian Lt Col Boslovayak thus explained the motives for his transfer to the national army:

"Why, after the collapse of the union army, has it become possible to serve in the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian armies, but not here? My experience and knowledge are needed here. And I precisely know that. But I do not know what awaits me there where the subunits are being withdrawn..."

Not only Vladimir Vasilyevich thinks like that. As my interlocutors told me, nearly 10 percent Russians, Ukrainians, and representatives of other nationalities serve on the Ministry of Defense staff alone. This percentage is hardly in the lowest command elements. But, in the process, can't it be a question of the fact that they have "bought" these people. Yes, they have preserved for themselves those meager material benefits which they have accumulated during their service. For now only Azerbaijan is incapable of paying its servicemen, regardless of their nationality, even those small salaries, for example, like those in the CIS Joint Armed Forces. This year the republic parliament has allocated nearly three billion rubles for the organizational development of the armed forces, but these resources are being expended not so much for the development of new as for the restoration of what has been lost in engagements.

Nevertheless, Ministry of Defense representatives think that the resources allocated by parliament should be enough, with zealous management, to have small (0.6-0.7 percent of the republic's population) but well equipped and combat capable armed forces by the year 2000, as they have

planned. That is what, in particular, Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense Rear Services Directorate Colonel Ali Mamedov thinks. After 20 years of service in the Soviet Army and the CIS Joint Armed Forces, he does not see another path but to take as the foundation the army the documents that are currently in force and, using them, create their own structures. The manufacture of field uniforms and military shoes has already been set up at republic enterprises. They are no different in cut from previous styles but they lag behind in quality for now, Ali Lyatif-ogly told me. The uniforms, that previously belonged to the union army, are being "worn out".

They also obtained regulations in the Azerbaijani national army's legacy from the union army. All republics that are creating their own armed forces are certainly encountering, or will encounter in the future, the problems of translating the regulations into the language of the native nationality and of adapting Russian military commands to native speech.

For now, servicemen are using the customary "comrade" with the addition of the military rank when addressing each other. But it is also developing its own scale of military ranks, and purely national: while rejecting Russian experience, the Ministry of Defense can't randomly grab enough experience from neighboring Turkey. The rank of "junior lieutenant" is being eliminated and the remaining ranks are receiving Azeri "transcription": Private—"syravk asker", warrant officer—"kizir", colonel—"yalbay"...

Changes will also appear in the military uniform with the introduction of purely national ranks. Called up from the reserve, now Senior Lieutenant Fuat Mamedov, deputy chief of military missions, discussed them:

"Eight-pointed stars—the symbol of unity of the eight ethnic groups that reside on the republic's territory, will be placed in a single line on our officers' shoulder boards above the traditional Azerbaijani ornament. And there will be a crescent on a background of crossed sabers and in a frame of oak leaves near the edge of the shoulder board. Its horns, turned toward the stars, signify watchfulness and vigilance—that is, those qualities which must be inherent to a soldier.

Indeed, quite a bit of time will pass before the new symbol adorns the uniform of officers in the republic.

"A total of nine Azerbaijanis served in the union army in the posts of deputy regimental commander or higher," Col Nuraddin Sadykov shared his thoughts on the future national army. His service record is generally typical for many senior officers of the former USSR who currently serve in the army of Azerbaijan. A military school, a number of leadership posts, studies at the Academy imeni M.V. Frunze and graduation from it with a gold medal, once again service, and the post of professor at that same academy. Having been released into the reserve, Nuraddin Sadykov received quite a few flattering invitations from the Republic Ministry of Defense but agreed only to the externally ordinary post of military advisor to the minister. "We are faced with creating anew the backbone of the army—the officer corps. There are not enough men from the Baku Combined Arms and the Caspian Naval Schools to do that. We will send lads to study in Russia in accordance with the agreement and we will train them at our own civilian VUZs

[higher educational institutions]. It is possible that at some time the question will arise about training at the military colleges of the United States and other NATO countries."

For now, the future officers of the Azerbaijani Army will pound the dirt of training ranges. The regular units that are being formed are being manned based on the draft and are exclusively involved with combat training and are not being enlisted for participation in an armed conflict. Other people, primarily volunteer (but not unpaid) formations, are accumulating combat experience. It has not been excluded that, in the future, they will make up precisely that part of the national army on which many of the world's countries primarily count. Service on contract is attracting not only the residents of the republic's native nationality. They told me at the Ministry of Defense Press Center that an international battalion has been operating for a long time and quite successfully in Nagorno-Karabakh. They also have their national heroes, on whose "example" future generations of "askers" [Turkish soldiers] will be educated. I do not have in mind the remote historical past. Those who are fighting in Karabakh are considered to be heroes and they name a Russian and a Jew among the best, besides Azerbaijanis...

And there certainly also is some sort of symbol of the army that is being created in this. In Tsarist Russia, Azerbaijani men were not conscripted for service. The serviceman's profession also did not enjoy respect here under Soviet rule. Therefore, today the Azerbaijani military critically assesses its own ability to fight and to defend the republic's interests with weapons in hand.

Of course, one can dream about a time when the peoples of the world will not take up arms against each other in order to resolve disputes between states. But while it exists, armies, their military-political blocs and alliances will also exist which demand enormous expenditures of their founding states.

As Republic Minister of Defense Rakhim Gaziyev told me, a mutual understanding has been attained between the ministry and parliament on this issue. In the minister's opinion, there is an understanding of their responsibility for the sovereignty of the republic in the rank and file elements. There is not even "dedovshchina" [hazing of conscripts] among compulsory service military personnel (but then again, maybe their own "dedy" have simply not "matured" yet?).

While listening to those words about responsibility, it was hard to get away from the thought of how important it is to understand something else: in an alliance with whom and how will the Azerbaijani army resolve the problems of its own organizational development that arise and will it not turn out to be a puppet in the political games of shortsighted politicians whom the minister of defense and his military-colleagues accuse of the escalation of the interethnic conflict and of attracting ever increasing numbers of new armed formations to it.

INCIDENTALLY. Based upon a mutual decision of the Azerbaijani leadership and the 4th Army command authorities (!), a motorized rifle regiment in BMPs [armored personnel vehicles] that was deployed at the village of Prishib of Dzhalilabadskiy Rayon was transferred to the

## STATE AND LOCAL MILITARY FORCES

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17 June 1992

republic's jurisdiction. And then representatives of the local authorities arrived to see the commander: issue us 10 armored personnel vehicles. In a documentary sense, everything appeared to be entirely legal and therefore the request was approved.

Unfortunately, the fruit of the "privatization" of the vehicles have turned out to be bitter. Due to the poor professional training of those "specialists" who sat behind the wheels of the BMPs and who rushed to transfer the vehicles to the Karabakh conflict area, the engines of two of the vehicles had already been "beaten to death" on the march, two BMPs fell into a chasm, and four were shot up by the opposing side, having barely reached Nagorno-Karabakh.

"Faks" Information Service

(ZAKAVKAZSKIYE VOYENNYYE VEDOMOSTI [Transcaucasus Military Bulletin] newspaper)

### **Georgian Defense Ministry Order On Military Service**

*92US0529B Tbilisi SVOBODNAYA GRUZYA  
in Russian 14 May 92 p 1*

[Text of "Order of the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Georgia 'On Military Service for Draftees Into the Armed Forces of the Republic of Georgia'"]

[Text] For the purpose of having the spring call-up carried out in an organized manner and based upon the 7 May 1992 decree of the State Council of the Republic of Georgia "On the Call-Up of Youth Into the Armed Forces of the Republic of Georgia in 1992," I order the following:

1. The military departments of rayons and cities of the Republic of Georgia, commencing in May 1992, are to carry out the call-up of youth into the Armed Forces of Georgia.
2. The call-up into the Armed Forces of the Republic of Georgia, for compulsory military service, of citizens ranging in age from 18 to 23 years, individuals who are not entitled to a deferment from compulsory military service or to whom the requirements of the law governing non-military alternative labor do not apply.
3. The call-up is to be carried out according to the extraterritorial principle in conformity with the administrative plan for local military organs of the Republic of Georgia.
4. The commanders of military formations and units of the Armed Forces and also the appropriate directorates are to prepare the military units and training centers for receiving the draftees and for organizing their military training.
5. When preparing the draftees for the call-up of youth, the military departments of rayons and cities will be guided by the decree of the government of the Republic of Georgia "On the Call-Up of Youth" and by the order of the Administration for Local Military Organs "On the Call-Up of Youth Into the Armed Forces for Compulsory Military Service."
6. The personnel of the Armed Forces are to be made familiar with the order.

[Signed] *T. Kitovani, first deputy chairman of the government and cabinet of ministers, and acting minister of defense for the Republic of Georgia*

### **Georgian State Council Decree On 1992 Draft**

*92US0529A Tbilisi SVOBODNAYA GRUZYA  
in Russian 14 May 92 p 1*

[Text of "Decree of the State Council of the Republic of Georgia 'On the Call-Up of Youth Into the Armed Forces of the Republic of Georgia in 1992'"]

[Text] For the purpose of strengthening the defensive capability of the Republic of Georgia and in conformity with the Georgian constitution, the State Council of the Republic of Georgia resolves:

I. To call-up into the Armed Forces of the Republic of Georgia, for compulsory military service, citizens ranging in age from 18 to 23 years who are not entitled to a deferment from compulsory military service or do not meet the requirements of the Law on Non-Military Alternative Labor.

1. To carry out the call-up of youth in the spring and autumn.
2. The duration of the compulsory military service is set at 12 months.
3. The right to a deferment from compulsory military service is authorized for:

—youth who are studying in state higher educational institutions and also youth who are pursuing courses of study at commercial higher educational institutes during the 1991-1992 academic year.

—students attending secondary and specialized educational institutions and up to the completion of work at an academic institution, but they must be no older than 20 years of age.

4. The following are not subject to compulsory military service because of family circumstances:

a) the only son (bread-winner) of disabled parents or a widowed mother, b) older brother—bread-winner for sisters and orphan-brothers, c) the only grandson, upon whom a disabled grandmother and grandfather are dependent, d) a young man with wife and children.

5. Only healthy young people may be called up for compulsory military service. The call-up of sick youth of draft age will be deferred based upon a decision handed down by a medical commission.

6. The number of young people called up for compulsory military service is determined by the State Council of the Republic of Georgia in behalf of the government of the Republic of Georgia.

7. Rayon and municipal call-up and medical commissions will be formed in the cities and rayons of the Republic of Georgia.

8. Within the government of the Republic of Georgia, a republic call-up commission will be created for managing the

rayon and municipal call-up and medical commissions of the Republic of Georgia and for controlling their activities.

The structure of the commissions and their method of operation will be defined by the government of the Republic of Georgia.

9. Service in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Georgia is an honorable duty of the citizens of the republic.

Persons who evade compulsory military service are subject to punishment in conformity with the existing legislation of the Republic of Georgia.

This decree enters into force upon adoption.

[Signed] *Chairman of the State Council of the Republic of Georgia, E. Shevardnadze.*  
*Tbilisi, 7 May 1992.*

## OTHER STATES, REPUBLICS

### Self-Propelled Guns Seized from Vladikavkaz Station

92UM1129A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
11 Jun 92 First Edition p 3

[RIA Article, under the rubric: "From Vladikavkaz": "Refugees from South Ossetia Have Seized Self-Propelled Guns. The Government Promises To Prevent Their Participation in the Conflict"]

[Text] A military train with combat equipment that was being withdrawn from Sputnik Military Facility on the outskirts of the South Ossetian capital was seized on June 9 at 17:00 hours at Vladikavkaz-Commodities Station. Several hundred men, the overwhelming majority of them refugees from South Ossetia, unloaded 11 self-propelled howitzers and four trucks from flat cars and breached an OMON [Special-Purpose Militia Detachment] cordon that had urgently arrived on the scene of the incident and ended up on the streets of Vladikavkaz. They managed to stop some of the vehicles through the efforts of the military and the republic leadership but several vehicles rushed through the entire city and were stopped on the outskirts. Several thousand people surrounded the vehicles that remained in the city and demanded that the vehicles be given to the refugees "for the protection of Tskhinval".

At an emergency session of the North Ossetia Defense Headquarters that was assembled as a result of this event, Republic Minister of Internal Affairs Georgiy Kantemirov reported that the artillery pieces were without their combat loads. He called the very fact of the seizure "an indicator of the increasingly aggressive mood of a certain portion of the population."

Meanwhile, some of the howitzers are continuing to move toward the Transcaucasian Highway but, based on Kantemirov's assurances, not a single one of them will pass. He said that all steps are being undertaken to stop them prior to Rokskiy Mountain Pass on the border with South Ossetia.

## GENERAL ISSUES

### ARMS TRADE

#### **Paper Investigates Military Personnel Involvement in Arms Sales**

*92UM1059A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA  
in Russian No 20, 13 May 92 p 13*

[Article by Mark Deych: "Antibusiness: A Military Exchange Novel"]

[Text] Recently the army has been criticized greatly and frequently. Those who do not accept this criticism assert that the Army is being slandered. The mothers of deceased soldiers and peacetime casualties want to boycott induction for regular service.

What is happening in the Army? Yes, we already know a good deal about the hazing which is supported and strengthened by certain officers, about their persecution of the rank and file and the corruption which permeates many army structures.

Let us be just: a majority of the officer corps continues to carry out their difficult service honestly. But at present it is particularly difficult as in all of society, there is disorder, dissatisfaction and conflicts in the Army.

Seemingly the Army, as the most important and healthiest part of the state organism, should hold up. If this has not happened then who is to blame for this?

As is known, a fish rots from its head.

For this reason I propose to talk about the head. About the army head.

Several extremely curious documents have fallen into my hands. They come supplied with all sorts of security classifications and of course, they were not destined for the mass information media. I would like to acquaint the readers with excerpts from these documents. I shall not comment on them as these documents, in my view, don't need this.

So, the first document.

"To the Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, Mar Avn Ye.I. Shaposhnikov:

"On the question of the legality of establishing and operating entrepreneurial structures approved by the military administrative bodies.

"I hereby report:

"Under the agreements between the CIS member states, the Russian Legislature, the legislature of the former USSR and the Russian program for the privatization of state and municipal enterprises, the privatizing of Armed Forces property is not provided for and in a number of instances is directly prohibited, that is, the transferral of military property under the decision of the military administrative bodies from state ownership to the ownership of nonstate entrepreneurial structures.

"However, certain officials of the CIS Armed Forces...are ignoring the demands of the law...

"For example:

"On the basis of the illegal order of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers No 315b (the draft of which was drawn up by the High Command of the Ground Forces and signed by V.S. Pavlov and under instructions of Army Gen V.I. Varenikov, in April 1991, property of the Armed Forces on the territory of West Germany, including plants for the overhauling of tanks, motor vehicles, engineer equipment, rock-artillery and radar weapons and equipment, dumps and depots for weapons, ammunition, equipment and supplies (over 200 installations) were turned over gratis to the Housing Conversion Concern. In the summer of 1991, this same concern prepared the draft of a decree of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers and according to this all the property to be released by the USSR Armed Forces in the groups of forces on USSR territory was to be turned over gratis to the ownership of the same concern. Only the events which occurred in August 1991 prevented the implementation of this decree;

"The state property being turned over by the Navy as charter capital to the joint stock company Nevikon has been estimated at 5 million rubles;

"The chief of the Military Medical Academy imeni S.M. Kirov as its share in the charter capital of a joint-stock bank has transferred buildings of the academy estimated at 2 million rubles;

"There is no system of accounting for the denationalization of Armed Forces property in the form of its transferral to nonstate entrepreneurial structures. As a result, the designated activities by the military administrative bodies are carried out in an uncontrolled and unsupervised manner and the prerequisites are created for abuses of greed. The officials of the military administrative bodies hold positions in the leadership of the entrepreneurial structures, regardless of the fact that in accord with Article 9 of the RSFSR Law On Competition and the Limiting of Monopolistic Activities on the Commodity Markets, the officials of the state administrative bodies and government are prohibited from holding positions in the administrative bodies of a managing principal.

"For example: according to available information, the Navy Deputy Commander and Chief of the Navy Rear Services, Vice Adm I.G. Makhonin is the president of the stock company Nevikon; the Commander of the Baltic Fleet, Adm V.G. Yegorov and the Deputy Chief of the Navy GIU [Main Engineer Directorate] Maj Gen Ye.P. Karabanov are the vice presidents of the stock company Russo-Balkt West; the Chief of the Military Medical Academy imeni S.M. Kirov, Lt Gen Med Serv G.M. Yakovlev is a member of the leadership of a commercial bank; the Chairman of the NTK [Scientific-Technical Committee] of the Engineer Troops, Maj Gen V.V. Kelish heads the international Housing Conversion Concern.

"Among the entrepreneurial structures set up with the illegal use of military property, a particular place is held by the stock company Military Exchange Section, the founders of which, by depositing 200,000 rubles each to the charter capital, are the military administrative bodies according to the appended list... (See Appendix 1.—M.D.).

"The designated stock company, in the idea of its founders, should actually monopolize the market for the sales of military supplies, appropriating as its property 10 percent of the market value of everything sold.

"Instead of organizing the elaboration of a legal basis making it possible for the Armed Forces to sell and utilize independently the military property to be released after the publishing of the Order of the USSR Minister of Defense of 1991 No 550 on the establishing of commercial structures, the officials responsible for this established a stock company, having illegally turned over to its ownership (privatized) over 2 million in state funds..."

"Chief of the Directorate of Affairs of the CIS Joint Armed Forces Lt Gen L. Ivashov

19 February 1992."

Now let us turn to another document. It has a short prehistory related to the appearance on the military stage of the new Minister of Defense, Mar Avn Ye. Shaposhnikov. In turn, the minister has brought new people into the military department. I do not know what criteria Ye. Shaposhnikov followed in this and I do not know if the entire Ministry of Defense underwent personnel changes. But I do know the situation in one of the main directorates. In our times—the times of universal buying and selling—this main directorate, if not the most important in the military ministry, plays a role that is undoubtedly very great. I have in mind the Main Trade Directorate [GUT] of the CIS Armed Forces.

On 3 October 1991, the Minister of Defense Shaposhnikov signed Order No 171: the Chief of the Rear Services for Long-Range Aviation, Lt Gen Karakozov was given a new position as chief of the GUT for the CIS Armed Forces. Lt Gen Karakozov made further changes in the main directorate. At a minimum, five of the top officials in the main directorate were dismissed and discharged into the reserves. For example, the 52-year-old First Deputy Chief of the Main Directorate, Maj Gen Ye.M. Kruglov who had very positive service recommendations was discharged into the reserves under a cutback in personnel. However, in fact there was no cutback in personnel and the position of deputy chief of the main directorate which Maj Gen Kruglov had held was kept inviolate.

The new chief of the directorate, Lt Gen Karakozov has also made new appointments. I know about five such appointments and all five of the new appointees are from aviation. So now military trade has acquired wings but, unfortunately, not those of angels.

Possibly, the Armed Forces GUT has merited such major personnel changes. But here in front of me is a statement on the checking of a collective appeal from the workers at the GUT of the CIS Armed Forces on the abuses of official position by the main directorate chief, Lt Gen Avn G.A. Karakozov. I was able to become acquainted with this statement, however, under the conditions that I not mention the names of the inspectors. But the results of the check are as follows:

"On 2 December 1991, by Order No 168/4-12202... Karakozov demanded that the Chief of the Trade Directorate of the Western Group of Forces (ZGV) Col F.M. Rezyapov establish most favored trade conditions for the closed-type stock company Rekont.

"In backing up the given decision, Karakozov gave the fact that as of 2 December 1991, the foreign firms Comhart, Bit, Montana, American Eagle and Misius had not delivered the goods promised for Soviet rubles for the GUT 'while the stock company Rekont had begun delivering food for the GUT.'

"On 3 December 1991, a protocol was signed on collaboration and deliveries of food between the stock company Rekont and the GUT.

"According to the given protocol, the stock company Rekont promised to deliver for the GUT some 5,000 tonnes of meat, 10,000 tonnes of flour, 1,000 tonnes of groats as well as vegetables and fruits. As of 1 February 1992, the stock company Rekont had actually made only one delivery in the interests of the GUT; namely on 15 January 1992, it had dispatched grain amounting to 71.8 tonnes (one carload) for the subsidiary farm of the Trade Directorate 1337 of the Volga-Ural Military District. The GUT does not have any other data on delivery of food and industrial goods by the stock company Rekont to the military trade bodies.

"According to the available information, the stock company Rekont carried out trade deals with the Trade Directorate of the ZGV and the foreign firms of Asia and the Near East, the goods of which are not in demand on the world market. The goods are purchased by the ZGV Trade Directorate from Rekont at the world price level.

"At the GUT any documents on this question are lacking since the trade deals are carried out only through third countries, bypassing CIS territory.

"Information has also been received that on German territory the equipment and weapons of the troops being withdrawn from Western Europe are being sold through the commercial structures of the stock company Rekont."

As you can see for yourself, in the statement a significant place has been given to the closed-type stock company Rekont. This company will also figure in the document which I will present to you a bit below, and probably this document will be the most interesting of those which I was able to get ahold of. For now let us return to the statement to note the strange good-will toward Rekont on the part of not only the Chief of the GUT of the CIS Armed Forces, Lt Gen Avn Karakozov, but also the Minister of Defense, Mar Avn Shaposhnikov. According to the statement, under the Orders of the minister of 27 November 1991, the stock company Rekont was to be provided with the following: 30 trucks, 10 UAZ-469 passenger cars, 3 truck-mounted Ivanovets cranes and 2 Zhiguli motor vehicles.

And again the statement mentioned the name of the minister of defense:

"According to the explanation of the former chief of the Trade Directorate of the Moscow Garrison... he, according

## GENERAL ISSUES

to the verbal orders of Comrade G.A. Karakozov on 2 December 1991, issued orders Nos 704 and 705 for the right to purchase imported furniture (the Renaissance dining room, the D-10 bedroom, the Gioconda hall, the 710 dining room, the Philippe office, and the Mona Lisa hall) with a total value of around 200,000 rubles to Citizen K.N. Silamov, and the Order No 705 was drawn up actually in his assumed name of V.N. Bydtayev. From the orders of Comrade G.A. Karakozov, he (the former chief of the Trade Directorate of the Moscow Garrison.—M.D.) learned that the given furniture has been acquired for Comrade Ye.I. Shaposhnikov and that was confirmed in the course of the current check and by Comrade Karakozov."

Now for the third and final document from the lamentable series. It was drawn up by the Committee on Legality and Law and Order of the Russian Supreme Soviet and signed by the committee's chairman Aslanbek Aslakhanov. The document persuasively and clearly demonstrates just what "heights" have been reached by the theft and corruption in the ZGV (See also Supplement 2.—M.D.).

"For Official Use

"To the Chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet R.I. Khasbulatov on the abuses in the ZGV in the sphere of trade and the sales of military equipment and property

"Esteemed Ruslan Imranovich!

"The Committee possesses information on abuses by the leading workers in the ZGV on the questions of organizing trade and selling property of the troops being withdrawn from Eastern Europe.

"Thus, in March 1991, the MVES [Ministry of Foreign Economic Ties] in the procedures set out by the Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers No 1112 of 19 October 1990 On the Sale of Chattels of the ZGV to be Released With the Withdrawal of Soviet Troops from West German Territory, drew up a contract to sell diesel fuel at 400 marks (West German) per tonne. However, the Chief of the Fuel and Lubricants Service, Maj Gen Semin, prevented the signing of the contract for a month and then 10,000 tonnes of fuel were sold to the Grunewald Firm and Mineral Oil Company KG but now at a price of 255 marks. An intermediary in this transaction was the SP [mixed enterprise] Mosennko-Invest and here the founders of this enterprise are the GUT of the former Ministry of Defense and the Main Technical Administration of the MVES.

"For this operation they received a commission of 100,000 marks while the state lost 1.5 million marks.

"Often the earnings from such deals are not deposited to the account of the ZGV Financial Service but are kept by the intermediaries.

"The use of intermediary firms owned by former USSR citizens has become widespread. The latter, having set up a series of plants and factories in countries with cheap manpower, sell to the CIS military trade low-quality goods under conditions which are disadvantageous for us. The basic

suppliers of these goods Fuksman, Sharfman, Chernyak and others are closely tied to the Chief of the ZGV Trade Directorate Rezyapov.

"In possessing information on Rezyapov's abuses, the Chief of the GUT of the USSR Ministry of Defense Karakozov travelled to Berlin, however his arrival merely strengthened the position of the person being inspected.

"As a result of the trip, the closed type Rekont stock company, with one of the founders supposedly being Karakozov and a number of highly-placed workers from the Ministry of Defense (put up with fictitious names) obtained the preferential right of selling and purchasing the property of the ZGV.

"Thus, by the Order No 168/4-12202 of 02 December 1991, Karakozov officially demanded that Rezyapov create the most favored trade conditions for Rekont. He justified his decision by the fact that Rekont had begun to deliver goods for the GUT of the Ministry of Defense.

"According to a later signed protocol on collaboration, Rekont assumed the obligation to deliver to the GUT some 5,000 tonnes of meat, 10,000 tonnes of flour, 1,000 tonnes of groats, vegetables and fruits, however only one car-load of grain (72 tonnes) was actually unloaded.

"Basically the Rekont Company carries out foreign-exchange trade transactions with the Trade Directorate of the ZGV and the foreign firms of Asia and the Near East and here the goods do not conform to the world standards, although they are purchased at exceptionally high prices, even if the deliveries come from the CIS countries.

"In March 1991, the ZGV Trade Directorate under a contract with the intermediary firm M+S International purchased 1 million bottles of Borzhomi mineral water and paid 870,000 marks for this, that is, a bottle of the domestic drink cost the troops 0.87 of a mark or 18 rubles, while Georgia was trying to sell the water at the domestic market price.

"In August 1991, with foreign exchange of the ZGV, the GUT of the USSR Ministry of Defense for 4.95 million marks purchased 3,000 tonnes of apples from the Chinese Xin-Min Company. According to the conclusion of specialists, the purchase price was more than double what it should have been and the direct loss from the deal was about 2.5 million marks.

"Such commercial activities by the GUT of the Ministry of Defense and the Trade Directorate of the ZGV have led to the overstocking of military trade. Just in the first half of 1991, its commodity stocks were 174 million marks. Ultimately many low-quality goods but suitable for the Russian domestic market were declared to be unsalable, they were converted from hard currency and now through Russian intermediaries were sold within the country at commercial prices.

"In concluding deals, the GUT of the Ministry of Defense does not require bank guarantees from the intermediaries and as a result of this it does not receive payment for a long time.

"In July 1991, under the guise of selling unsold goods, the Ministry of Defense GUT concluded a contract for a total of 20 million marks with the Intercomcenter Formula-7 Concern. By the end of 1991, it had shipped almost 15 million marks of goods, however they had not been paid for.

"The representatives of this concern themselves select the goods (under the pretext of not being in demand) and without licensing, as military property, redirect it into the country for sale, extracting a profit four times in so doing. Formula-7 uses a 14-percent rebate on the purchasing prices as granted to the Ministry of Defense GUT by the German side, it acquires goods at the nominal price without a mark-up, it sends them into the Russian Federation without duty being paid and sells them at commercial (free) prices.

"The operations involving the duty-free importing of goods (under the guise of military property) owned by the Formula-7 Firm are criminal, and in their actions one can see the qualifications of crimes under the heading of smuggling.

"From September 1990 through April 1991, the ZGV Trade Directorate granted an interest-free state credit of 99.5 million marks under the condition of repayment in 1991-1992, however up to the present no specific measures have been taken to retire it. At the expense of repayment, they practice the offsetting of disadvantageous contracts and the foreign exchange is transferred to foreign banks.

"There are also materials showing the transferral of foreign exchange assigned for providing amenities to the troops being withdrawn to foreign banks.

"In February 1991, 5 million marks were transferred to one of the Zurich banks, an equal amount in March 1991 to Geneva and in June to Helsinki. In July of last year, 2 million marks were sent to New York.

"The leadership of the Ministry of Defense has been informed by the appropriate services about the illegal activities of individual workers from the GUT of the former Ministry of Defense and particularly its subunits in the foreign groups of forces, including on the abuses by the ZGV Commander-in-Chief Burlakov both in Germany and in Hungary.

"Also among the persons named was Rezyapov under whom loss-producing deals had become widespread, however the attitude of the leadership of the Ministry of Defense GUT toward him made him invulnerable. For abuses committed in the city of Leningrad, the Procurator Gavrilyuk was to be retired, but instead of retirement, he was transferred to Germany and his lack of supervision and patronizing of the workers from the ZGV Trade Directorate helped to broaden the illegal activities of the traders.

"The existing situation has led to the point where the traders have set up mafioso structures where they, in addition to the workers from trade and its subunits, have drawn in a number of German citizens. Their activities can cause enormous economic and political harm to the Russian Federation and flagrantly violate the laws of Germany. In December of 1991, the German Police arrested the ZGV Chief of the Trade and Service Enterprise Lt Col Danilo and the employee Sokolov and initiated an investigation against

Vasilyev for violating legislation in the business sphere and for causing harm to the German side amounting to over 2 million marks. Presently the German special services are collecting materials which show the illegal activities of a number of highly-placed officials from the ZGV and it is not to be excluded that at a certain stage, these can be used to harm the political and economic interests of Russia.

"With such a situation the metastasis of corruption and abuses could not help but involve the servicemen of the ZGV as well.

"Even in the current year, criminal liability was instituted against Capt Lazorenko who sold to foreign intelligence secret units from the Parol [Password] State Identification System; arrested were Capt Vasilenko and warrant officer [praporshchik] Borshch who had made and sold to foreigners a video film with a secret code table; Pvt Parusov sold a key document from the classified Interior communications equipment. There is abundant information also about other servicemen...

"Committee Chairman A. Aslakhanov"

Such is the situation in the Western Group of Forces which is about to cease its existence. Although the report of the Supreme Soviet Committee on Legality and Law and Order has released the names of certain army speculators, I doubt that they will be held liable. At the same time, the state suffers significant material losses, even if one does not count the losses from the sale of military secrets. It is completely impossible to estimate the moral harm caused.

#### Appendix 1.

List of Founders of the Stock Company Military-Exchange Section:

DIRECTORATE OF THE CHIEF OF THE CIS AIR FORCES IN THE PERSON OF LT GEN V.S. GOROKHOV.

DIRECTORATE OF THE CHIEF OF AIR FORCES WEAPONRY IN THE PERSON OF MAJ GEN L.S. PANKRATYEV.

THE MILITARY ACADEMY IMENI F.E. DZERZHINSKIY IN THE PERSON OF COL GEN YU.I. PLOTNIKOV.

THE DIRECTORATE FOR THE SUPPLY OF EQUIPMENT AND AUTOMATION IN THE PERSON OF LT GEN A.P. TRUSHKIN.

THE CENTRAL UNIFORM DIRECTORATE OF THE CIS ARMED FORCES IN THE PERSON OF LT GEN M.M. KHRANOV.

THE MAIN MILITARY MEDICAL DIRECTORATE OF THE CIS ARMED FORCES IN THE PERSON OF COL MED SERV YU.N. SAVVIN.

THE CENTRAL DIRECTORATE FOR MISSILE FUEL AND FUEL OF THE CIS ARMED FORCES IN THE PERSON OF LT GEN B.A. BLOKHIN.

THE CENTRAL FINANCIAL DIRECTORATE OF THE CIS ARMED FORCES IN THE PERSON OF LT GEN V.V. VOROBYEV.

THE MAIN ARMORED DIRECTORATE OF THE CIS ARMED FORCES IN THE PERSON OF COL GEN A.A. GALKIN.

THE DIRECTORATE OF THE CHIEF OF THE ENGINEER TROOPS IN THE PERSON OF COL GEN V.I. KUZNETSOV.

## GENERAL ISSUES

The Main Motor Vehicle Directorate in the person of Lt Gen N.A. Zazulin.

**Niyazov: Turkmenistan Wants To Sell Fighters**  
*92UM1105A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
 in Russian 27 May 92 p 3*

[Unattributed article "Turkmenia"]

[Text] "Turkmenistan intends to trade weapons with foreign countries." This was announced on 26 May by the Republic's President Salarmurat Niyazov, in meeting with a collective from the Turkmenistan Academy of Sciences.

In his words, the government plans to grant the requests of certain states and sell a batch of combat aircraft. They plan to sell 223 multipurpose fighters assigned to the base of the 73rd Air Army stationed in the town of Kizil-Arvat in the west of the republic.

Niyazov did not mention the names of the specific purchasers of the aircraft nor the total which Turkmenistan intends to receive for them. However, according to data from army sources, for each aircraft at present one could earn from 15 to 20 million dollars.

In speaking on 23 May with the command of the troop units and subunits stationed on the territory of Turkmenistan, President Niyazov, however, stated that he does not view weapons trade as an item in the republic's income.

**Plant Official on Efforts to Sell MIG-29s Abroad**  
*92UM1100A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
 4 Jun 92 First edition p 3*

[Interview with Moscow Aircraft Production Association Foreign Economic Ties Administration Chief Fedor Mikhaylovich Timofeyev by Major E. Fedoseyev: "Can You Purchase MIGs Directly at the Plant?"]

[Text] The Soviet MIG-29 has become the first domestically-produced fighter aircraft which, beginning in 1988, has regularly participated in international aviation exhibitions. According to the comments of foreign experts, the MIG-29 is the embodiment of the technical achievements of our time and can compete with the best fighter aircraft models of that class that are being produced by the leading Western countries. Therefore, the interest in purchasing MIGs, which many foreign states are displaying, is so natural. Indeed, this interest is mutual. Our country is no less interested in selling them. The cost of one combat aircraft is \$25-30 million and contracts for deliveries of shipments of these aircraft reach \$1.5-2 billion.

Moscow Aircraft Production Association Foreign Economic Ties Administration Chief F.M. Timofeyev told our correspondent about how one military enterprise that produces MIGs is reorganizing its operation and attempting to access the foreign market.

[Fedoseyev] Fedor Mikhaylovich, until recently, all deliveries of Soviet weaponry abroad was carried out through state structures and was strictly controlled by them. What is the situation right now?

[Timofeyev] Actually, previously we were kept away from contacts with foreign customers and we were involved only with production issues. Now the situation, I hope, is fundamentally changing. Our Moscow Aircraft Production Association has acquired the capability to independently search for foreign buyers. Our administration, which now deals directly with foreign customers, was also created to support foreign economic activity. And I must say that organizing operations in this way, I have in mind direct contacts, is eliminating a lot of old problems and is increasing the efficiency of our operations. So, after three months of independent activity, we have received more than 100 offers which are now being painstakingly studied by our experts.

[Fedoseyev] But today only Oboroneksport [Defense Export] has the right to deliver military equipment abroad.

[Timofeyev] Yes, for now we are only independently conducting preliminary negotiations. The final signing of contracts is carried out by Oboroneksport.

Right now we have submitted proposals to parliament and to the government which, if adopted, will expand our rights.

[Fedoseyev] During the purchase of any equipment, and all the more so military equipment, the customer strives to obtain guarantees that the equipment will be maintained, repaired, and supplied with spare parts without disruptions. As you yourself certainly know, in the past we frequently received reprimands with regard to the poor organization of maintenance. There were also complaints directed at you. Today, what guarantees can your enterprise give that these disruptions will no longer occur?

[Timofeyev] All of these problems were associated with the old multilayered bureaucratic system and lack of coordination between departments when many orders simply were stuck somewhere in bureaucrats' offices. We lost not only high-priced contracts but, this is most distressing, our good name. Now we want the customer to have dealings directly with us and this will radically change the business. And I can say with complete certainty that we are prepared to follow the letter of signed agreements and to fulfill all of our customers' requests within time periods that correspond to world standards.

[Fedoseyev] Yes, but you are a state enterprise. Who will be responsible if the contracts are breached?

[Timofeyev] I think that this will hardly occur. As for our fighter aircraft themselves and their flying specifications, there has not been one bad comment during the entire time of production. And 26 of the world's countries have purchased them. Besides, right now we are changing the organization of maintenance and supply. So a customer does not have to worry.

And now the essence of your question. I can say that the association itself is responsible for all obligations. And if arbitration decides that our side is guilty of breaching a contract, then we are prepared to pay the appropriate fines.

[Fedoseyev] And how is your work being structured after the signing of contracts?

[Timofeyev] We guarantee the maintenance of an aircraft throughout its entire service period and that is 20 years. The first year, the MIG is maintained under warranty free of charge. Furthermore, we are ready to create joint service facilities at which foreign specialists who have been trained by us will work.

[Fedoseyev] But besides you, there are still many related enterprises. What is their interest in maintaining high quality?

[Timofeyev] Our association would like to structure its operations in such a way that everyone who participates in the development of an aircraft would receive part of the hard currency profit. First of all, the state, then related enterprises, intermediaries, the Ministry of Defense that trains pilots, and so forth.

#### MiG-29 Sales Via 'Oboron-Eksport'

92UM1128A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
11 Jun 92 First edition p 4

[Letter from reader and reply: "Do You Want a MiG-29? Call us!"]

[Text] I read the article "MiGs may Be Bought Right at the Plant" in your newspaper (4 June of this year) with interest. I am sorry, but I did not understand two details: Where is the plant itself located? Is it authorized to sell its product on its own?—B. Reutov, associate with a closed joint-stock company, Saint Petersburg

The board of directors of the Moscow Aviation Production Association [MAPO] has informed us that negotiations on the sale of MiGs are being conducted with the assistance of Oboron-Eksport in conformity with international legal standards. If preliminary contractual agreements are reached, the Russian government will issue MAPO a license to sign a contract, including the provision of all spare parts, a service warranty and essential airfield equipment and armaments.

MAPO address: 125040, Moscow, 1st Botkinskiy proyezd, 7. Commercial Division. Fax number: (095) 252-89-14.

(Incidentally, we plan to write about the MiG-29 fighter itself in an issue of the newspaper in the near future.)

## DEFENSE INDUSTRY

### Russian Investment Credits Insufficient to Save Defense Industries

92UM1104A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA  
in Russian 26 May 92 p 2

[Article by Aleksandr Golyayev: "Conversion Measures too Cheap"]

[Text] The Russian Federation government has decided to provide from the 1992 state budget investment credits in the amount of 10 billion rubles per quarter for use in specific conversion programs. This action has prompted the Russian Federation of Independent Trade Unions to submit its own recommendations to the Government Commission on Conversion Problems relative to the budgetary allocations.

The FNPR [Russian Federation of Independent Trade Unions] is of the opinion that the budgetary amounts are decidedly inadequate - they will not prevent defense enterprises from falling into bankruptcy.

The trade unions have devised a number of suggestions. One of the latter would permit enterprises to set up and operate a mutual credit system. Also suggested is removing export license restrictions imposed on items manufactured by the military-industrial complex and changing the amounts of levies, thus allowing enterprises to retain at least 70 percent of foreign exchange revenue.

### Tbilisi Aircraft Plant Turns to Commercial Models

92UM1104B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 30 May 92 p 6

[Article by ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA correspondent David Mdivani: "No 31 Accepting Orders"]

[Text] It was common knowledge—in spite of the secrecy surrounding Tbilisi Plant No 31—that fighter aircraft were being built there. Even during the time of the Patriotic War, the plant sent more than 3,000 fighters to the front. The Tbilisi people were later among the first to devise a system for manufacturing jet aircraft.

The Tbilisi people are again in the forefront of innovation, this time by introducing changes into the range of their product offerings. It appears that the final touches will soon be put to producing so-called business aircraft. The YaK-58, which has been designed in the famous Yakovlev Design Bureau, measures up completely to its design goals. It offers simplicity of operation and maintenance, easy takeoff and landing on unpaved airstrips, and the capability of carrying six passengers.

Although plans call for an initial output of up to 60 units, actual production capacity is triple that amount. In addition, the craft's design is cleverly adaptable for various applications, such as a transport type capable of hauling 600 kilograms of cargo, a patrol type, an ambulance version, and others. Aircraft designed for such applications are in wide use in many countries.

## MILITARY CONFLICT, FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

### Velekhov on Withdrawal of Brigade From Cuba

92UM1109A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 14 May 92 pp 1, 4

[Article by Leonid Velekhov under the rubric "Cuba": "Will the Russian Training Brigade Be Withdrawn From Cuba?"]

[Text] Will the Russian training brigade be withdrawn from Cuba? And along with it all of the other things which are of far greater strategic military importance to Russia?

Interfax passed on information it obtained from inside Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs that today, 14 May, there is to be a simultaneous announcement in Moscow and Havana on the renewal of bilateral talks on the withdrawal of a Russian military brigade based there.

The very fact is remarkable that so much significance is being attached to the return to the homeland of what is strictly a training formation numbering slightly more than 3,000 men, something perfectly natural in the contemporary political situation. This significance becomes even more obvious when we recall the history of the matter, and the difficulty of resolving the problem becomes even more unquestionable.

At the beginning of September last year Mikhail Gorbachev announced that the Soviet brigade would be withdrawn from Cuba in the immediate future. This announcement, a complete surprise to official Havana, came as a shock. A conflict arose, which subsequently had a great deal to do with the worsening of relations between Moscow and Havana and with Castro's course of systematically and openly criticizing everything occurring in the USSR and then in Russia.

Talks on the brigade's withdrawal nonetheless began in mid-November. An official Soviet delegation headed by Ambassador for Special Missions Ustinov spent more than 2 weeks in Havana and returned empty-handed. The participants did not comment on the talks, and one can only guess what the stumbling block was on the path to resolving what would appear at first glance to be a fairly simple matter.

As we make our guesses, we shall not ignore the factor of Castro's pride. He was deeply hurt by the fact that the question of the Russian military presence on the island under his authority was decided without his participation, like what occurred in the Caribbean crisis of 1962. Even though the 3,000-man brigade's presence was of strictly symbolic importance from the purely military standpoint, we must not forget that symbolism plays an important role in politics. The brigade's presence symbolized the physical existence of a third force on the island which could only with difficulty remain completely neutral in an extreme situation of open conflict between Cuba and the USA, the possibility of which Cuban propaganda has discussed with particular persistence lately.

These factors which complicated the November talks have probably become to a large degree unimportant at the current stage, however. The USSR no longer exists. Castro has quite clearly stated his attitude toward the new, noncommunist Russia. Russia has precisely defined its course of eliminating ideology from its foreign policy. In other words, it will not be possible to reach agreement amicably (as was the case in the past). Castro understands this very well.

One stumbling block remains, however, the largest, the existence of which keeps one from saying with certainty that the current stage of talks will end successfully and the brigade will be withdrawn. In fact, the question of the brigade's withdrawal involves the larger strategic military interests of the former USSR, which were inherited by Russia. A base for our submarines is located on Cienfuegos near the coast of Cuba, thanks to which our submarines can ply the waters washing the American continent the year round—and not just out of curiosity. We have an eavesdropping and ground-tracking station in (Lurdese), a suburb of

Havana, which enables us to derive information by monitoring the continent. Even considering the fact that Russia, with its new political course, no longer has a need for such intelligence-gathering and strategic bases, the fate of many millions worth of installations still has to be decided—and not to the detriment of our country.

The question of the brigade has never been linked by either party to the bases at Cienfuegos and (Lurdese), particularly since they are even today a subject of strict secrecy. NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA offered a supposition on this matter back in December of last year, directing attention to the fact, among other things, that along with the delegation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a military delegation headed by Adm Chernavin, commander in chief of the Soviet Navy, was also in Cuba. The substance and the outcome of the latter delegation's visit remained totally shrouded in secrecy. This supposition was obviously correct, and the Cuban regime is strictly linking the brigade's withdrawal to the matter of retaining the two secret bases. Gorbachev's September initiatives are still breaking up on this reef. One should assume that the matter of withdrawing the brigade, which has long since been an example of how our leadership could make promises and not keep its word, will depend upon whether Russia succeeds in coming up with a solution to the matter of the bases.

#### **U.S. Research on Naval Fire Support to Ground Forces**

*92UM1130A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
11 Jun 92 First edition p 3*

[Article: "They Will Conduct Research"]

[Text] The U.S. Defense Department plans to conduct special research on "Naval Fire Support to Ground Forces." This has to do with plans for employing advanced artillery systems, salvo-fire missile launchers and guided missiles in the performance of support missions. They can strike up to 55-75 kilometers into the defensive depth, compared with 406-mm guns, which have an operating range of 35-45 kilometers. The ABRS version of the multi-barreled anti-missile system should be regarded as an interim weapon. Officials of the navy believe that it is technically feasible to install such launchers on ships which have well-decks, such as assault landing ships. These advanced missile systems, already in use in the ground forces, will increase the effective firing depth to 72 kilometers.

The mission of providing fire support to a smaller depth is now assigned to 127-mm artillery (Mk45 and Mk42) on cruisers and destroyers. Temporary measures (for the period extending to the year 2000) are now being considered, which would increase the width of the coastal zone within range of fire-support weapons.

Improving the ammunition for the 127-mm guns and the Mk41 vertical-launch systems (UVP) is being proposed as an alternative. The use of larger-caliber weapons is still an open question. At the present time Ticonderoga-class cruisers and Spruance- and Arleigh Burke-class destroyers are armed with the vertical-launch systems. It is expected that the following versions of munitions will be proposed for a

comparative assessment based on the "cost-operational effectiveness" criterion: a standard SMASHER missile warhead with self-contained guidance for firing from a standard vertical-launch system with the existing fire-control system; one using the engine and hull of the Patriot missile with three different warheads (one for destroying unprotected targets, one for well-protected targets and one with cluster bombs). The launching of the missile from the vertical-launch system will be effected with a munition fired from a vertical-launch system with fiber-optic guidance. This version is now being examined by the U.S. Navy.

Since the munitions designed for use with vertical-launch systems are too expensive and have a shorter storage life, the munitions for the 127-mm guns are also being improved. The plans call for missiles fired from vertical-launch systems to be used to destroy targets at longer range, while artillery guns will enter the battle when fire support is required in the zone contiguous to the coastline.

## SECURITY SERVICES

### Deputy Commander-in-Chief on CIS Border Troops

92UM1068A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
28 May 92 First edition pp 1, 2

[Interview with Lt Gen Boris Agapov, deputy Commander-in-Chief, Border Troops; and chief, Main Operations Directorate, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Capt B. Soldatenko: "Lt Gen Boris Agapov: We Serve the People"; on the occasion of Border Guard Day (28 May), place not given; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] From KRASNAYA ZVEZDA files: Lieutenant General Boris Nikolayevich Agapov was born into the family of a border guard on 6 February 1946, in the Turkmen settlement of Bakharden. He graduated from the Alma Ata Border Command School. He served in various commissioned assignments in border troop units. He subsequently graduated from the Foreign Language Department of MGU [Moscow State University] and the Eastern Department of DGU [Far Eastern State University]. In 1978 he completed his studies in the Military Academy imeni M. Frunze. He served two tours in Afghanistan, the last one as that of deputy commander of a border district. Subsequent to the withdrawal of our troops, he continued to be involved in security of our state borders with Afghanistan until the year 1991, at which time he was appointed deputy commander in chief of the Border Troops and chief of the Main Operations Directorate.

He is the only member of the Border Troops of the former Union to hold the award For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces in all three classes.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Boris Nikolayevich, before we start, let me congratulate you on this holiday and your promotion. However, this is such a time we are living in that our conversation will constitute nothing less than business as usual, even though today is a holiday. The conference of

heads of state of our Commonwealth recently completed its session in Tashkent. One of the items discussed there involved the Border Troops.

[Agapov] Yes, the agenda was quite full in Tashkent. Heading the list were the Agreement on Commonwealth Border Troop Manpower Acquisition and Associated Military Service, and the Agreement on Commonwealth Border Troop Finance Arrangements. However, in my opinion, long overdue and presently necessary were the interstate Agreement on Border Troop Weapons, Military Equipment, and other Procurement, and the Organization of Scientific, Research and Development Projects; and the Agreement on a Pension System for Border Troops and Their Dependents, and State-Financed Insurance for Border Troops of Commonwealth of Independent States Members. It is my hope that those items will help us acquire confidence for the future.

There is nothing secret about the difficult situation the Border Troops fell into after the breakup of the USSR with respect to what they need to carry out their missions. Thus, the agreement on border troop financing is associated with the formulation of a unified budget for troop maintenance, weapons expenditures, construction, pensions, state-financed insurance for servicemen, etc. It has been decided that the budget will be built by setting fixed amounts of contributions or by independent financing of individually organized border troops, including those placed under Russia's jurisdiction. The particular magnitude of fixed amounts to be levied on each state for collective financing will be established by the Commonwealth Council of Heads of State.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] The USSR has broken up, but soldiers wearing green caps remain on the state borders. Ukraine already has officially organized her own border troops, and some of the other countries of the former Union are doing the same. This being so, just how are the borders of the former Union republics being guarded? Of particular interest in this regard is the Baltic area. Why are we guarding the border there if that is not even a part of the CIS? When will our Border Troops be withdrawn from there?

[Agapov] Indeed, the former borders of the USSR are being watched over by Commonwealth Border Troops or by a state's own border troops, which have already been formed by Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic states. And on the soil of Moldova, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, the troops stationed there are under the jurisdiction of Russia.

Now about the Baltics. The agreement made with those states calls for Russian Border Troops to guard the borders temporarily in that area, working jointly with the border troops of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. This arrangement will be in effect to provide security for Russia and the other Commonwealth states, until the borders between Russia and the Baltic countries will be finally drawn. (Negotiations dealing with this are in progress.) On that score, I wish to say emphatically that the Border Troops will commence a phased withdrawal from those territories as soon as the Russian and Baltic state borders are finally set and written into law. These things will take place with the introduction of a new system for guarding the new borders.

## GENERAL ISSUES

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] You have said that more than half the republics of the former Union are organizing their own border troops or are in the process of doing so. With this in mind, what does this bode for the future of the CIS Border Troops?

[Agapov] The future of the Commonwealth states in the overall scheme is to be determined by the spirit and the letter of the CIS agreements on border issues. The major areas of involvement are seen to consist of the following: the formation of cohesive unified CIS Border Troops, with a welcome mat set out for new member states for the Commonwealth; assistance to any Commonwealth member that wishes to create its own border forces; and close cooperation and mutual assistance between Commonwealth Border Troops and border troops belonging to any one of the member states. In this connection, it is considered to be counterproductive to exert pressure on any one member state to set up its own troops, since this is seen as a potential cause of many problems, including the expenditure of considerable efforts, additional expenses associated with acquisition of tangible and financial resources, and difficulties related to uncertainties about the future on the part of a great number of border troops and their dependents. This applies in equal measure to Russia, which is also faced with the problem of organizing border protection relative to the new boundary lines.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Until recently, we heard speeches from high rostrums about the "transparency" of CIS borders, but now, it seems to me, there is nothing more said about that. I made a recent visit to a KPP [border control post] located in the city of Mogilev-Podolskiy (Ukraine). The border troops on duty there, in addition to customs checking, inspect the passports of citizens travelling from Ukrainian territory to Moldova and back. What kind of transparency is that?

[Agapov] The term "transparency" of the borders separating the Commonwealth states refers to border openness for crossing by persons and transport vehicles. The establishment of this kind of scheme for state borders has nothing to do with the discussions raised by certain news media as an item associated with the "euphoria of Commonwealth creation." This is simply a reality that has come about as a result of the signing on 20 March of this year of the Kiev Agreement on Guarding of State Borders and Maritime Economic Zones of CIS Member Countries.

Incidentally, Ukraine, in signing this agreement, made it clear that the state border is to be accorded "uniform importance throughout its length," but she has not extended protection to its borders with Russia and Belarus. On the other hand, Ukraine has set up border control on its boundary with Moldova.

It is common knowledge that Romania and Moldova have reached agreement relative to a simplified procedure for crossing the border. With the control wielded over Romanian citizens passing through Moldova so weak, a number of them have crossed over into other CIS states, since the borders are "transparent." Quite a number have attempted to accomplish illegal entry into China, Finland, and other

countries. This situation points out the need for effecting coordinated actions on CIS external borders, and honoring all the security interests of other Commonwealth states, especially in the formulation of international agreements dealing with a border system, border crossing, and customs rules. In this regard, I must say that, in general, attempts at isolating oneself at a border and erecting palisades for the length of the border (to replace the former "common iron curtain") will in no way be helpful in a political or economic sense, or in any efforts related to a struggle against illegal activities perpetrated by border violators. What are needed are mutual assistance, well-coordinated joint efforts, and - I repeat - consideration of the parties involved.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] The newspaper office has recently been receiving letters from parents whose sons are serving in the Transcaucasus. I accompanied some soldiers' mothers on a visit to a Nakhichevan border troop detachment. What I saw was that border troops serving in that kind of "hot spot" are due much credit: They often lack water, lighting, and heat, and often must cook their meals over an open fire. But they have not given up; they continue to do their military duties. Relative to that I have a question: Are there plans to withdraw our border troops from there? What is your committee doing to stabilize the situation in that area?

[Agapov] It is quite true that the border troops in the Transcaucasus are carrying out their duties, which are difficult enough in general, under hardship conditions. This is especially true of the Azerbaijan border sector. Our committee is in control of the situation, maintaining constant contact with the organs of authority, security, and internal affairs, and with other agencies and organizations. We are generally able to cope with whatever situation that arises. However, serious obstacles will remain until substantial measures of a political nature are taken to stabilize and remove the difficulties from the situation existing in the area.

Also involved with hardships are our border troops serving in various areas of Turkmenistan and Tajikistan hit by natural calamity. Mud flows literally swept away our alarm systems; in addition, some of our border station structures suffered damages. Even now - on this holiday - border troops are engaged in cleanup operations following the natural calamity, helping to restore dwellings for shepherds.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] The Supreme Council of Russia recently passed the Law on Operational and Investigative Activities in the Russian Federation. This is a Border Troop function with which the readers are least familiar.

[Agapov] You have brought up a topic which previously was not to be discussed. Actually, operational and investigative activities as they relate to state border security came into being as soon as the Border Guard of the Russian state was organized. The first reference to it was made in service instructions and regulations written for the Separate Border Guard Corps of Russia at the end of the 19th century, although we know that a system for acquiring operational information and detection of indications of illegal border activities predated that. Why is there a need for border troops to conduct operational and investigative activities at the present time?

This kind of activity is designed to detect crimes associated with border violations and apprehend persons engaged in either the planning or actual commission of crimes. Something else that bears mentioning here is that intelligence services of neighboring countries are attempting to carry illegal activities across the border. This unfortunately is a present reality. In addition, a major threat to Russia and the other Commonwealth states exists in the form of carrying across the border weapons, ammunition, and drugs, plus smuggling activities. Illegal border crossings are being made by terrorists and members of various Mafia-type organizations. Criminal bands have formed in a number of sectors, where they act in a concerted manner on both sides of the border. Since this activity is being carried out in secret, in an atmosphere of utmost conspiratorial confidence, combat against this kind of "activity" can be waged only in an operational manner, by employing special forces and equipment.

With respect to manpower acquisition, the operational agencies are supplied with graduates of higher schools of the Border Troops system and the Russian Federation Ministry of Security. More than 90 percent of the associates working in operational agencies possess a higher legal or specialized education.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Boris Nikolayevich, now briefly about Border Guard Day. What significance does it hold for you this year?

[Agapov] A holiday is always a source of pleasure. And I would like to point out that organs of state authority and control, and collectives in enterprises, institutions, and organizations, do not let this holiday slip by unnoticed. True, we always do celebrate this, our holiday, quietly. What we do is largely meet with Border Troop veterans and former members of the troops, and we engage in cultural and sports events.

### Tensions Between Latvian, Russian Border Troops Examined

92UM1098A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
4 Jun 92 First edition p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Major S. Knyazkov, Baltic Border District: "The Border Post is Ahead... of the Border: Was the Incident with Russian Servicemen in Latvia Accidental?"]

[Text] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA recently published a troubling report. On 14 May, Latvian Republic untrained volunteer force personnel [opolchentsy] used firearms against Russian border guards in a forest near the village of Garkalna, which is several dozen kilometers from Riga. Eighteen-year-old Private Nikolay Pylayev from Samara was wounded.

Already several months ago, I didn't doubt for a minute that rifle fire against a border guard would not be accidental. At that time, the border issue in Latvia was strained to the limit. So far the Baltic Border District is perceiving with indignation Latvian Republic Supreme Soviet Deputy Janis Freimanis' article, "Latvia, gde twoi ministry" [Latvia, Where Are Your Ministers?] (15 February 1991, DIYENA,

the official Latvian newspaper). The deputy openly called for the use of weapons to clean out our border guards from border facilities and the airport and seaports.

"I think that the statement of our Officers' Assembly has cooled excessively hot heads," Riga Separate Border Control Post [OKPP] Commander Colonel Vladimir Rudakov told me.

Other Officers' Assemblies also issued similar statements and the Baltic Border District Military Council sent a request to the leaders of the Russian Federation and the Latvian Republic to take steps to prevent the incitement of passions and to resolve disputed issues at interstate negotiations. At that time, the border district military council requested that B. Yeltsin take the Baltic Border District under Russia's jurisdiction.

The appropriate Russian Federation Presidential Decree was signed on 18 March 1992. And already on 27 March, Russian Federation Representative on the Issues of the Temporary Presence and the Withdrawal of Border Troops from the Territory of the Latvian Republic, Baltic Border District Commander Lieutenant-General Valentin Gaponenko and Latvian Republic Minister of Defense Talavs Jundzis signed a protocol on cooperation in the protection of the border and the delimitation of powers between the Russian and Latvian border guards. The previously strained relations have begun to be put right. That is why you can call the incident near the village of Garkalna unpredictable.

"Since 1 April, in accordance with the protocol, Latvia has taken under its control border control at Riga Airport and at its sea ports," continued Riga Separate Border Control Post Commander Col Vladimir Rudakov. "Local border guards process all ships and airliners. They invite us to participate in the processing of required documents only in those cases when CIS interests are affected. That is, if people, transport vehicles or cargoes arrive that are transiting to, through, or from the CIS..."

A Latvian representative, who is the shift supervisor, resolves disputed issues.

The 27 March protocol also discusses the problem of guarding the land and coastal border. For the beginning, Russian border guards will transfer two existing border posts here for temporary use. Incidentally, the republic television and press have covered in adequate detail the first Latvian border company that is going on duty to defend the border and that is deployed at Mikeltornis (Ventspilska Rayon).

Even though the Latvian border guards have deployed on the border, they are lacking many things: both in practical experience and in material support.

They have "torn apart" our developments but they cannot carry them out. And they clearly cannot decide how to guard the border: either our way, the harsh variation, or a more loyal, Scandinavian way," noted Border Detachment Commander Col Leonid Korotovskikh. "They invited me to transfer to them for service but I answered: 'Help—I will help, but my duty—is to guard Russia!'"

Incidentally, the flattering proposals to Leonid Ivanovich are far from accidental. Many commanders of Latvian border troops are his former subordinates. The Latvian Border Brigade Chief of Staff (it consists of seven battalions) is Lt Col Yanis Mortukans who at one time was deputy commander of Frontier Post imeni Latvian Red Riflemen, then Korotovskikh's deputy for physical training...

Border Guards Battalion Commander Lt Col Juris Plushchевский and Ventspils Port Border Control Post Commander Major Ivar Kozinda also served in the border guards detachment... Even right now they can count on Leonid Ivanovich's advice. All the more so since subordinates of that same Kozinda are quartered on the first floor of Ventspils Border Control Post.

Well, when I arrived at the Border Control Post, the two on-duty border guards—a Russian and a Latvian—opened the gates even for me...

"Yes, everything is half and half at our place," explained Ventspils Border Control Post Commander Lt Col Nikolay Kuznetsov, "although initially they wanted to live separately. They said, you take the first floor and do with it as you like. But later we sat down—negotiated and, with the authorization of the detachment commander, we decided not to put artificial barriers in each other's way."

"You saw," continued Lt Col Kuznetsov, "that we are standing duty together at the Border Control Post, border guards eat together in one mess hall according to our standards, and we clean up the grounds together..."

I will not hide that I was interested in whether the Border Control Post Commander is afraid that the Russian lads, how can I put this a bit more mildly, will not greet the new lodgers kindly? Maybe he could have answered all sorts of ways but for the officers to be able to explain everything as they need to, although, I will add from myself that it is becoming more difficult to respond to the direct questions of subordinates. For example, why must they guard the border of a foreign state? We have to explain that it is not so easy to build border facilities at a new location.

There are also a multitude of other problems. Right now there will be 37 percent less authorized personnel strength in the border detachment, after the release into the reserve of servicemen who have served the prescribed terms. The manning situation is approximately the same in other border district units and nevertheless service continues. Here are just several short reports that attest that the Russian border guards are earning their keep.

On 27 March, during the processing of passengers of the departing Riga-Stokholm flight, a border violator, Mr. Lesotho, who was attempting to depart to Sweden using forged documents, was arrested by border control department Controller Senior Warrant Officer V. Londar.

In April, at Kaliningrad Separate Border Control Post's Bagrationovsk Border Entry Point, Major Anatoliy Kisenlenko's Border Detachment detained KamAz and MAZ trucks with trailers in which they discovered 80 barrels of pure drinking alcohol. The cargo was destined for the Polish company Elster...

Of course, we must not idealize the current situation of Russian border guards in the Baltic Region. They have to perform their official duties under conditions of unending moral pressure from the Latvian Republic's independent state and social structures.

"Field Gosbank's [State Bank] Liyepaya Department issues us money only for payment of servicemen's salaries," they complained at the border detachment. Customs demands 7,000 rubles per container from officers and warrant officers who are departing Latvia and the customs tax on exported personal items is such that it is easier to sell everything than to take it with you. Our only hope is that we will be withdrawn on troop trains," honestly admitted my interlocutor.

In confidential conversations, many in Riga and Ventspils told me that they are afraid that hasty decisions will be made on the withdrawal of the Baltic Border District to new unequipped points. There, their lives will begin on totally bare sites.

How much longer are Russian border guards destined to be on Latvian soil? No one can answer that for now. But I am convinced that we must resolve this issue without a show of weapons as occurred on 14 May near Riga.

It is significant that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the first time delivered a protest to the Latvian Republic Embassy with regard to the attack with the use of firearms that was undertaken by Latvian untrained volunteer force personnel against a group of unarmed Russian servicemen. Moreover, the ministry warned that henceforth the Latvian side will bear the entire responsibility for the possible consequences of such actions and it also demanded a thorough investigation of the crime, punishment of the guilty, and compensation for the material and moral damage caused to Private Nikolay Pylayev and to troop equipment.

To some, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' harsh statement will seem to be intolerable in the difficult dialogue between the two sovereign states. But how else can it call on the Latvian side to restore order in the activities of its numerous and not very organized military formations? Really, not only the military are catching hell. At the beginning of May, a passenger was wounded while riding in a light helicopter [legkovushka] in the border zone, which they stopped by firing at it. In April, untrained volunteer military force personnel killed and wounded several people during the course of various skirmishes [razborki] just during one day in totally different areas of the republic. Self-defense forces, the police, untrained volunteer military force personnel, the security service, ayzsargi [translation unknown] have weapons and they all have their own commanders-in-chief. And it is extremely dangerous if, due to the permissive attitude of politicians, random people who are intoxicated with nationalism and armed with assault rifles ruin the interstate contacts that have been put right with difficulty through their rash and provocative actions to the detriment of everyone.

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has waited for 10 days for information about the steps taken from the embassy, however, no official reaction whatsoever from Latvia has followed. So, the next provocations?

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